2026年美以军事打击爆发后，伊朗当局实施了长达88天史无前例的全面网路断网，给当地数位经济与民众生活造成沉重打击。相较于以往针对抗议或危机时的短期封锁，这次断网不仅持续数月，更彻底粉碎了仰赖技术知识和VPN谋生的专业人士的希望，迫使如工程师纳维德等科技从业者陷入无助，甚至萌生远走他乡的念头。

在此次断网中，伊朗政府展现了更为成熟的「国家资讯网路」（NIN）及先进的「白名单」审查机制，将数位治理逻辑从全盘切断转为阶层化控制。除国产内部网络外，全球网际网路预设对大众全面封闭，仅特权阶层、国企、部分学术机构及愿意支付高额费用的商业用户才能获得访问权限，形成了一种以租金抽成和忠诚度为基础的分级上网体系。

面对官方对基础设施近乎绝对的掌控，传统的翻墙工具如VPN逐渐难以突破技术壁垒，而走私入境的「星链」（Starlink）等卫星网路正成为打破封锁的新希望。尽管政府透过无人机搜查和电子干扰极力遏止，民间团体与海外异议人士仍积极协助引入卫星终端设备并开发共享架构，使这场围绕资讯自由与严密审查的技术博弈迈向了全新的维度。

Following the military strikes by the US and Israel in early 2026, the Iranian government imposed an unprecedented 88-day nationwide internet blackout, inflicting catastrophic damage on the local digital economy and daily life. Unlike past short-lived disruptions during protests or crises, this prolonged shutdown crushed the hopes of tech professionals who rely on technical expertise and VPNs, leaving software engineers like Navid in utter despair and prompting thoughts of emigration.

During this blackout, the Iranian regime demonstrated a matured National Information Network (NIN) and an advanced whitelist-based censorship apparatus, shifting its digital policy from blunt disconnection to sophisticated, tiered control. The global internet became inaccessible by default to the general public, while unfettered access was selectively granted to political elites, strategic enterprises, and wealthy users willing to pay exorbitant fees, creating a rent-seeking and loyalty-driven digital hierarchy.

As state control over core telecommunications infrastructure renders conventional circumvention tools like VPNs increasingly ineffective, smuggled satellite services such as Starlink have emerged as the new frontier for bypassing restrictions. Despite the government employing drones and electronic warfare to detect and disrupt terminals, digital rights activists and diaspora groups are facilitating the distribution and shared access of satellite gear, escalating the enduring cat-and-mouse game into a new era.