欧洲民粹主义政客擅长将社会不满归咎于外部势力，但在面对中国这一完美的潜在攻击目标时却表现出奇特的盲区。尽管中国对工业龙头的大规模补贴已造成欧盟对华每天高达10亿欧元（约合11.5亿美元）的巨额货物贸易逆差，并直接引发了包括德国核心工业区在内的工厂倒闭潮与新一轮“中国冲击”担忧，但欧洲左右翼煽动家大多不愿对北京发难。德国选择党（AfD）甚至主张德国参与中国的“一带一路”倡议，匈牙利欧尔班领导的青民盟（Fidesz）成为其坚定拥护者，而法国左翼政党“不屈法国”（Unsubmissive France）则警告欧洲不要介入台湾事务；相比之下，仅有意大利总理焦尔吉娅·梅洛尼（Giorgia Meloni）退出“一带一路”以及少数北欧右翼针对间谍活动发出零星警告。

这种“中国民粹空白”背后交织着个人利益与意识形态的复杂动因。在德国，选择党联席党魁爱丽丝·魏德尔（Alice Weidel）早年曾在中国工作多年并能说流利普通话，其博士论文课题正是中国的养老金制度；而在民粹派执政的国家，中资企业的巨额直接投资为其亲信带来了丰厚回报，欧尔班的前外长在离职数周后便迅速出任中国电动汽车巨头比亚迪（BYD）的游说代表。更深层次的原因在于，北京的威权主义与鲜明民族主义对欧洲强人极具吸引力，他们将欧盟奉行的绿色发展与人权规范视为自缚手脚的“软弱全球主义”，反而倾向于将中国视作对抗布鲁塞尔现有国际秩序的效仿范式。

然而，欧洲民粹主义者面临的最核心制度悖论在于，若要有效抗衡北京的经济胁迫，恰恰需要他们平素极力抨击的“更多欧洲”整合与布鲁塞尔统一行动。尽管欧盟已对中国电动汽车加征关税，但中国产品进口量依然持续攀升；9月16日，欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen）公开警告对华贸易逆差已逼近“临界点”，并暗示将出台进一步的惩罚性贸易措施。随着中欧全面贸易摩擦不可避免地步步升级，面对大多数选民对华持负面看法的民意现实，此前因忌惮为欧盟决策背书而保持缄默的欧洲民粹政客将难以继续置身事外，不得不尽早明确中国究竟是其效仿的治理样本还是该口诛笔伐的系统威胁。

European populists who routinely blame foreign adversaries for domestic grievances have developed an astonishing political blind spot regarding China. Despite vast industrial subsidies driving a crushing bilateral goods-trade deficit of €1bn ($1.15bn) per day in China's favor and sparking fears of a deindustrializing "China Shock" across core manufacturing hubs like Germany, political firebrands largely refrain from vilifying Beijing. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) openly advocates participating in China's Belt and Road Initiative, Hungary’s Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party act as vocal champions of Chinese commerce, and the leftist Unsubmissive France warns against European interference over Taiwan. Isolated counterexamples—such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni abandoning the Belt and Road or sporadic espionage warnings from Nordic nationalists—remain conspicuous exceptions to this continent-wide demagogic restraint.

This conspicuous populism gap is driven by both material self-interest and ideological affinity. In Germany, AfD leader Alice Weidel is a dedicated Sinophile who speaks fluent Mandarin and wrote her doctoral dissertation on the Chinese pension system; in populist-governed nations, massive capital infusions yield immediate windfalls, evidenced by Orban’s long-standing former foreign minister becoming a corporate lobbyist for Chinese carmaker BYD weeks after leaving office. Crucially, Beijing’s unvarnished authoritarianism and muscular nationalism appeal directly to European aspiring strongmen, who contrast state-directed power against the European Union's perceived multilateral indecisiveness. Viewing adherence to international climate and human-rights norms as geopolitical self-sabotage, many populists see China not as a destructive economic competitor, but as an enviable blueprint for defying the Western liberal order.

Nevertheless, challenging Chinese economic dominance presents European populists with an insurmountable ideological conundrum: confronting Beijing effectively requires greater supranational centralisation in Brussels, the exact mechanism they despise. Although the EU has levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, import volumes continue to surge, prompting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 16th to declare that the trade imbalance had reached a decisive "tipping point" requiring potential trade retaliation. While anti-globalist firebrands have remained silent to avoid legitimizing Brussels' institutional authority, impending trade conflicts will soon force them into the open. As geopolitical confrontation accelerates, Europe’s populists will be compelled to determine whether China constitutes an authoritarian model to emulate or a predatory menace to confront.

Source: Why Europe’s populists forget to bash China

Subtitle: An ideal target gets a free pass from the demagogues

Dateline: Sep 17th 2026\n