研究者認為，BDC貸款利率的異常攀升並非單純反映信用風險的增加。銀行內部的信用評估並未出現明顯惡化，且銀行對BDC貸款的違約損失率估計反而更低。真正的原因在於銀行對BDC融資市場的高度集中壟斷——前三大銀行佔據約一半市場份額，前十大銀行佔超過八成，加上BDC幾乎從不更換銀行合作夥伴，使得銀行在重新談判信貸額度時擁有極強的議價能力。
文章進一步指出，債券市場同樣對BDC收取了高於同評級借款人的利差，且時間點與銀行融資成本上升幾乎一致，這使得因果方向難以判斷。可能是市場對BDC集中持有中端槓桿貸款的風險重新定價，也可能是銀行的壟斷性擠壓效應蔓延至債券市場。無論哪種解釋，BDC以專業債務融資能力為核心商業模式，卻在自身融資成本上付出了過高代價，這一發現頗具諷刺意味。
Business Development Companies (BDCs) represent roughly a quarter of middle-market private credit assets, with about half of the median BDC's total assets financed by debt. A new study by Federal Reserve economists Sharjil Haque and Jessie Wang examines BDC bank borrowing from a monetary policy transmission perspective, finding that BDC loan rates spike disproportionately during Fed tightening cycles compared to non-BDC borrowers with similar internal credit assessments.
The researchers argue that the BDC premium is not primarily driven by credit risk concerns. Banks' own internal assessments did not deteriorate, and loss-given-default estimates for BDC loans were actually lower. Instead, the key driver appears to be the extreme concentration of the bank lending market for BDCs—the top three banks control roughly half the market, and BDCs rarely switch banking relationships—giving incumbent banks outsized bargaining power during credit line renegotiations, particularly when BDC funding demand rises during monetary tightening.
The article also notes that bond markets imposed similarly elevated spreads on BDCs at roughly the same time bank funding costs jumped, complicating the causal narrative. This could reflect market-wide repricing of the concentration risk embedded in BDC portfolios, or it could represent a spillover from banks' monopsony pricing power into public debt markets. Either way, the finding is ironic given that BDCs' entire business model rests on their supposed expertise in structuring and negotiating debt financing, yet they appear to overpay on their own borrowing costs due to a lack of competitive shopping among bank lenders.