中国、俄罗斯和美国都一直在以看似例行的方式测试卫星，但这些做法也可能支持在轨攻击；《金融时报》对中国军事教科书和近100篇与PLA有关论文的审阅显示，北京正以多么严肃的态度为太空冲突做准备。文章将太空描绘为一个新的作战领域，在这个领域中，近距离操作、卫星检查和双用途机动可以用于维护，也可以用于使敌方资产失效；中国专家则认为，控制太空有助于控制地球。随著美国警告中国正在建造干扰器、雷射和改变轨道的系统，紧张局势也在升高，而美国太空军如今已公开把太空视为战争领域，而不只是支援领域。
证据包括一系列中国测试和理论表述：2022年1月，Shijian-21使用机械臂把一颗报废的北斗卫星拖到墓地轨道；在2024年，5颗中国实验卫星进行了近距离机动；而在6月，一次GEO交会对接测试可能是同类中的首次。与PLA有关的研究还描述了加注系统、多臂捕获航天器、量子通信、反卫星导弹、用于瞄准的天基感测，以及甚至轨道轰炸概念；而一本2024年教科书则说，太空作战应支援陆、海、空联合作战，并可包括威慑、封锁和进攻性打击。中国也在扩展实际基础设施，包括海南的文昌航天发射场和山东的海上发射平台，同时透过GEO雷达影像和量子密钥分发提升持续监视能力。
战略利害关系极高，因为卫星网路支撑通讯、电网、导航、金融和军事指挥，所以即便有限的干扰也可能产生连锁效应；文章援引美国的担忧称，一次有针对性的打击可能瘫痪指挥和监视系统。数字凸显了这场竞赛：特朗普政府寻求在明年将美国太空军开支提高近80%，达到$76bn；中国计划在2024年到2030年间部署超过37,000颗新卫星，而一名中国官员表示，目标是具备6万到10万颗LEO卫星的容量。分析人士警告，PLA对威胁的某些认知可能被夸大，对地球的天基打击因成本和复杂性而可能只带来有限的实际优势，而在一个没有历史先例的领域中发生的战争可能会迅速且不可预测地升级。
China, Russia, and the US have all been testing satellites in ways that look routine but can also support attacks in orbit, and the Financial Times review of Chinese military textbooks and nearly 100 PLA-linked papers shows how seriously Beijing is preparing for a space conflict. The article frames space as a new warfighting domain in which proximity operations, satellite inspection, and dual-use maneuvers can be used either for maintenance or for disabling enemy assets, with Chinese experts arguing that controlling space could help control Earth. Tension has risen alongside US warnings that China is building jammers, lasers, and orbit-moving systems, while the US Space Force now openly treats space as a domain of war rather than support.
The evidence includes a series of Chinese tests and doctrinal statements: in January 2022 Shijian-21 used a robotic arm to tow a defunct Beidou satellite into graveyard orbit, in 2024 five Chinese experimental satellites carried out close-range maneuvers, and in June a GEO rendezvous test may have been the first of its kind. PLA-affiliated research also describes refueling systems, multi-arm capture spacecraft, quantum communications, anti-satellite missiles, space-based sensing for targeting, and even orbital bombardment concepts, while a 2024 textbook says space warfare should support joint land, sea, and air operations and can include deterrence, blockade, and offensive strikes. China is also expanding practical infrastructure, including Wenchang spaceport on Hainan and sea launch platforms in Shandong, while improving persistent surveillance through GEO radar imagery and quantum key distribution.
The strategic stakes are high because satellite networks underpin communications, power grids, navigation, finance, and military command, so even limited disruption could have cascading effects; the article cites US concerns that a targeted strike could cripple command and surveillance systems. Numbers underscore the race: the Trump administration sought to raise US Space Force spending by almost 80% to $76bn next year, China plans to deploy more than 37,000 new satellites between 2024 and 2030, and one Chinese official said the goal is capacity for 60,000 to 100,000 LEO satellites. Analysts caution that some PLA threat perceptions may be exaggerated, that space-based strikes on Earth may offer limited practical advantage because of cost and complexity, and that war in a domain with no historical precedent could escalate quickly and unpredictably.