报告称，2024年全球工业补贴总额达1,080亿美元，其中52%集中在中国，为金融危机后第二高水准。按收入计算，中国航空航天企业获得的补贴是OECD同业的2至5倍；汽车业约高4倍；半导体方面，全球平均补贴约占营收2%以上，而中国企业在2021至2022年接近10%。研究还指出，中国太阳能板市占率自2005年以来由14%升至87%。
OECD认为，补贴有助于市占率上升，但未带来生产力或获利改善，反而可能像体育禁药一样让效率较低的企业不公平地胜出。中国企业较常透过低于市场利率的软贷款获得支持，甚至信用评级较差者也能从国有银行借到远低于美欧高信用企业的利率；同时，中国企业近年补贴揭露更不透明，财务报表可得性也下降。
The OECD says Chinese firms have expanded rapidly in autos, shipbuilding and solar, with subsidies and cheap loans playing a major role. A company-level study across 15 key industrial sectors finds that nearly 60% of Chinese firms’ global market-share gains since 2005 can be attributed to subsidies, and that in 2024 Chinese companies received on average three to eight times more state support than firms in the 38 OECD countries.
Global industrial subsidies reached $108bn in 2024, with 52% in China, the second-highest level since the 2008-09 financial crisis. By revenue, Chinese aerospace firms received two to five times more support than OECD rivals, car-sector subsidies were about four times larger, and semiconductor subsidies in China reached nearly 10% of revenue in 2021 and 2022 versus a global average of just over 2%. Solar panels show the sharpest market-share jump, from 14% to 87%.
The OECD argues that subsidies have lifted market share without improving productivity or profitability, creating risks similar to doping in sport because less productive players can win unfairly. It also says Chinese firms rely especially heavily on below-market soft loans, including from state banks to weaker borrowers, and warns that Chinese corporate subsidy disclosures have become less granular and financial statements less available in recent years.