中国正推动一项覆盖西部地区的长期投资计划，核心在新疆与西藏，目标是把这些地区更紧密纳入中国主流经济、人口流动与供应链。西部面积约占中国近三分之一，约为英国的10倍；政策同时被视为对外部制裁与抵制的反制。分析人士认为，北京正把西部从低价值的「大后方」转为面向欧亚的「大前线」，以提升贸易连通性、资源开发与边境安全。

旅游、基建与能源成为成长引擎。新疆去年接待3.23亿人次游客，较疫情前约2.10亿大增；西藏约7,000万人次，较2019年的4,000万明显上升。新疆目前至少有163家国际连锁酒店营运，2025年新增40家，另有52家在建或规划中。西藏雅鲁藏布江水电项目被估计规模前所未有，发电能力约为三峡大坝的3倍，预计到2035年可向中国南方输送逾60GW基荷可再生能源，并透过一条70亿美元超高压输电线连接广东与香港。

但经济扩张并未削弱安全与同化控制。约1,200万维吾尔及其他穆斯林少数族群仍受密集监控，拘留营虽在2019年底大多关闭，但监狱、拘留中心与强制社会控制网络仍在。研究指出，新疆与西藏的基建也提升军事与双用途能力：CSIS追踪2017至2022年间发现数十个机场、直升机场被新建或升级，其中20多个具军事功能；FT分析显示至少18个此后再扩建。2025年新疆与西藏的地区GDP年增率分别为5.5%与7%，高于全国平均；但批评者认为，资源、劳力与文化代价主要由当地少数民族承担。

China is driving a long-term investment programme across its western regions, centred on Xinjiang and Tibet, to pull them more tightly into the mainstream economy, population flows and supply chains. The west covers about one third of China’s landmass, roughly 10 times the size of the UK, and the policy is framed as a counter to external sanctions and boycotts. Analysts say Beijing is recasting the region from a low-value “backline” into a “frontline” linking China more directly to Europe and Eurasia.

Tourism, infrastructure and energy are the main growth engines. Xinjiang received a record 323 million visitors last year, up from about 210 million before the pandemic; Tibet drew about 70 million, versus 40 million in 2019. Xinjiang now has at least 163 international-chain hotels operating, with 40 openings in 2025 and another 52 properties under construction or planned. In Tibet, the Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower project is described as unprecedented, with capacity about three times that of the Three Gorges Dam; by 2035 it is expected to deliver more than 60GW of baseload renewable power to southern China, linked by a $7 billion ultra-high-voltage line to Guangdong and Hong Kong.

Yet economic expansion has not reduced security and assimilation controls. About 12 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities remain under intensive surveillance, and although most detention camps in Xinjiang closed in late 2019, prisons, detention centres and coercive social control systems remain in place. Research also shows the infrastructure boom has military and dual-use value: CSIS tracked dozens of airports and heliports under construction or upgrade in Xinjiang and Tibet from 2017 to 2022, more than 20 of them serving military functions, and FT analysis finds at least 18 have expanded further since 2022. Regional GDP growth in 2025 was 5.5% in Xinjiang and 7% in Tibet, both above the national average, but critics say the costs of resource extraction, labour coercion and cultural erasure are borne chiefly by local minorities.