在习近平推动人民币国际化大约10年之后，文章主张缺少的催化剂其实是Donald Trump：自他重返白宫以来的12个月里，关税波动、对联邦准备理事会（Federal Reserve）的攻击，以及反复无常的地缘政治，推动美元跌至4年来低点，同时美国国债殖利率上升到足以让日本银行（Bank of Japan）不安的程度。在此背景下，习近平的圈子透过《求是》（Qiushi）重新翻出他在2024年的相关评论，释放出再度推动「强势人民币」的讯号，将其定位于全球贸易、金融与储备持有之用，即便中国仍面临房地产主导的放缓与通缩压力。

文章将Trump的政策组合描述为自我造成的「品牌摧毁」，并引用美国国家债务正「失控」地逼近$39 trillion，以及避险需求推动黄金在上月升至每盎司$5,500的历史新高。它声称关税作秀与中国创下$1.2 trillion的历史性贸易顺差同时发生，而美国制造业部门则在流失工作，政府也在救助因海外销售走弱而受创的农民。文章同时凸显美国「exorbitant privilege」与市场不安之间的张力：美国仍能以约4%的殖利率卖出10年期债务，但整体行为被描绘为正在削弱人们对以美元为中心体系的信心。

就可行性而言，文章强调要拉下美元王座需要中国进行重大改革：放松资本管制、让人民币完全可兑换、建立可信的支付轨道，并强化制度，包括提高中央银行的独立性。它指出人民币国际化在2016年纳入IMF的SDR货币篮子时加速，但大约10年后，人民币在全球外汇储备中的占比仅约2%，而美元约57%、欧元约20%，各种管制仍在吓退储备管理者。额外限制还包括北京对美国资产的曝险（约$682 billion的Treasurys，相较之下日本约$1.19 trillion）、中国房地产负担（约70%的家庭资产在不动产），以及在人口约1.4 billion的社会中转变储蓄行为的政治经济现实；文章结论认为，Trump的威胁（包括针对BRICS的美元替代方案祭出100%关税）重要性不如美国是否恢复可信度，以及习近平是否能加速改革、快到足以利用这个缺口。

After roughly a decade of Xi Jinping pushing yuan internationalization, the article argues that the missing catalyst is Donald Trump: in the 12 months since his return to the White House, tariff volatility, attacks on the Federal Reserve, and erratic geopolitics have helped drive the dollar to 4-year lows while U.S. Treasury yields rose enough to unsettle the Bank of Japan. Against this backdrop, Xi’s circle resurfaced comments he made in 2024 via Qiushi, signaling a renewed push for a “strong yuan” positioned for global trade, finance, and reserve holdings, even as China still faces a property-led slowdown and deflationary pressure.

The piece frames Trump’s policy mix as self-inflicted “brand destruction,” citing U.S. national debt “careening” toward $39 trillion and safe-haven demand pushing gold to a record $5,500 per ounce last month. It claims tariff theatrics have coincided with China posting a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus, while the U.S. manufacturing sector sheds jobs and the administration bails out farmers hurt by weaker overseas sales. It also highlights the tension between America’s “exorbitant privilege” and market unease: the U.S. can still sell 10-year debt at about 4% yields, yet the broader behavior is portrayed as undermining confidence in the dollar-centric system.

On feasibility, the article stresses that dethroning the dollar would require major Chinese reforms: loosening capital controls, making the yuan fully convertible, building trusted payment rails, and strengthening institutions, including greater central-bank independence. It notes that yuan internationalization accelerated in 2016 when it entered the IMF’s SDR basket, but about 10 years later the yuan is only about 2% of global FX reserves versus about 57% for the dollar and roughly 20% for the euro, with controls deterring reserve managers. Additional constraints include Beijing’s exposure to U.S. assets (about $682 billion of Treasurys, versus Japan’s about $1.19 trillion), China’s property overhang (about 70% of household assets in real estate), and the political economy of shifting savings behavior across a population of about 1.4 billion; the article concludes Trump’s threats (including 100% tariffs over a BRICS dollar alternative) matter less than whether the U.S. restores credibility and whether Xi accelerates reforms fast enough to exploit the opening.