北极曾以北极理事会等机制维持谨慎合作，但俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后迅速转为战略竞争并加速军事化。莫斯科调整其「北极2035战略」（较「2020」版本更雄心）以因应新环境，并暂停向北极理事会缴纳年度会费；其余7个成员国也在入侵后中止与俄方的大部分合作（7/8），使原本用于在竞争中保留沟通的主要论坛冻结。

在西方资本与技术受限下，俄罗斯更强力转向亚洲，把北方海航道（NSR）打造为连接巴伦支海与太平洋的物流主干。对中国而言，NSR契合「极地丝绸之路」；北京投资亚马尔与北极LNG-2等项目，并在欧洲缩减进口之际推动液化天然气流量上升，降低对马六甲海峡等南方咽喉点的依赖。朝鲜则以罗先港作为俄东北最接近的太平洋出口，配合罗先—先峰经济区等构想提供转运节点与劳动力（在动员与人口趋势恶化下，俄方短缺更突出）。

经济协作正外溢至安全层面：俄中在阿拉斯加附近的联合海上巡逻显示军事操作协同增强，俄亦可能利用罗先、清津等港口扩展通往太平洋的海军通道。美国同时增加北极存在并投资破冰船、阿拉斯加基础设施与军事设施，但盟友分担与格陵兰等争议削弱一致性。较可行的回应是恢复北极理事会的有限沟通渠道、与韩国与日本等非北极但具能力伙伴深化造船、破冰与海上监视合作，并形成整合安全、能源与环境的长期策略。

The Arctic was once managed through cautious cooperation via institutions like the Arctic Council, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shifted it toward strategic rivalry and faster militarization. Moscow is adapting its Arctic 2035 Strategy (more ambitious than its 2020 predecessor) to a harsher environment, withholding its annual Arctic Council payments; the other seven members suspended most cooperation with Russia after the invasion (7/8), freezing the main forum that balanced competition with communication.

Cut off from Western capital and technology, Russia is pivoting harder to Asia, trying to turn the Northern Sea Route (NSR) into a logistics artery from the Barents Sea to the Pacific. For China, the NSR supports the Polar Silk Road; Beijing has invested in Yamal and Arctic LNG-2, and LNG flows have risen as Europe curtails imports, reducing reliance on southern choke points like the Strait of Malacca. North Korea seeks a role via Rason as Russia’s nearest Pacific outlet in the Northeast, with ideas like the Rason-Sonbong zone offering trans-shipment and labor (more attractive as Russia’s shortages deepen under mobilization and adverse demographics).

Economic alignment is now bleeding into security: Russian-Chinese naval patrols near Alaska signal stronger operational coordination, and Russia could use ports like Rason and Chongjin to expand naval access to the Pacific. The United States is increasing its Arctic presence with investments in icebreakers, Alaska infrastructure, and military facilities, but burden-sharing frictions and disputes (including Greenland) weaken unity. A workable response is restoring limited Arctic Council communication channels, deepening cooperation with capable non-Arctic partners like South Korea and Japan on shipbuilding, icebreaking, and maritime surveillance, and adopting a coherent long-term strategy integrating security, energy, and environmental priorities.