尽管持续七周、超过40天的交火，结果却是伊朗出人意料地受益。自2月27日后，其估算日收入由约1亿美元增至约1.75亿美元，因短暂制裁豁免和油价上涨；德黑兰不再被迫以折扣卖原油，反而可卖出溢价。粗略估算，战时新增现金约等于战前单月原油收入。若封锁收紧，储槽满载将逼使其在数日到数周内关闭部分油井。过往经验显示抗压力不低：2020至2021年特朗普推行“最大压力”时，原油出口降至每日不足25万桶（约3.4万吨/天），在油价低迷期日收入仍不超过1,000万美元，但政权并未让步。
中国过去从伊朗进口约11%，仅低于来自俄罗斯20%与沙乌地阿拉伯14%；在最近的冲突中其受影响反而最小。若实施港口封锁，中国与伊朗相关进口至少会减少五分之一，并将被迫动用其战略石油储备。中国已在十年内建立超过10亿桶（约1.36亿吨）的分层储备。即使两个月中断，仅可能消耗其应急储备约10%。因此封锁可能收效甚微：即使中国外交部长Wang Yi呼吁维持脆弱停火，伊朗的韧性与中国的可用储备仍可能让这场对抗持续超过华府的政治耐受度，犹如约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所言，困境在于经济算盘对比政治时限。
The article argues Iran’s oil exports underpin both Tehran’s wartime finances and China’s energy security. Before the Iran–US war, about 95% of Tehran’s sanctioned crude exports reportedly moved to Beijing through opaque tanker, trader, and finance networks. The U.S. has said ships in Iranian waters could be intercepted, diverted, or captured; if it enforces a blockade in the Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea east of Hormuz, Iran could be prevented from exporting even one barrel. Washington appears to target Tehran economically while trying to force China to pressure it.
Despite seven weeks and more than 40 days of fighting, Iran has unexpectedly profited. Since Feb. 27, estimated Iranian oil revenue rose from about $100 million per day to around $175 million per day, helped by a temporary sanctions waiver and higher prices, allowing Tehran to sell at a premium instead of a discount. A rough estimate puts incremental receipts at roughly one month of pre-war oil income. If enforcement tightens, filling storage tanks could force Iran to shut in wells within days or weeks. Historical precedent is notable: in 2020–2021, during former President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure,” exports fell below 250,000 barrels per day (about 34,000 t/day) and daily income stayed under $10 million, yet Iran did not buckle.
China entered the conflict with higher reliance on Iran than neighbors: about 11% of its oil imports, versus about 20% from Russia and 14% from Saudi Arabia. A full port blockade could cut at least one-fifth of that supply link and push China to use strategic reserves. China has built layered stocks of over 1 billion barrels (about 136 million tonnes) in a decade; a two-month interruption might consume only about 10% of emergency reserves. In short, the strategy looks weak: if Iran keeps finding revenue and China can absorb short-run shortages, the economic arithmetic may outlast White House pressure, and as in Keynesian spirit, Iranian defiance and Chinese cushioning may outlast U.S. political patience.