Polymarket的争议集中在可疑交易模式与执法落差。Bubblemaps指出6个帐户在前24小时内入金，并于空袭前数小时大额下注；另一帐户「Magamyman」据称在该事件上获利超过US$500,000。更早案例还包括对Nicolás Maduro事件获利超过US$400,000，以及在Google相关市场获利US$1.2 million。美国本已禁止战争赌注与内线交易，但Polymarket以巴拿马实体营运的国际平台加上加密匿名性，提升了监管与追责成本。
Kalshi则呈现相反风险：强调合规，但规则可理解性与结算体验引发反弹。平台近期曾罚款并封禁2名违规交易者；然而在轰炸后，即使Donald Trump宣布Khamenei已死亡，Kalshi仍冻结相关市场，并依「若死亡则按死亡前最后价格结算」的既定条款处理。部分「Yes」方虽方向判断正确，仍因买入价高于最终结算价而亏损。Kalshi最终退还全部手续费与净损失，成本达US$2.2 million，凸显「自由交易」与「规则确定性」之间的结构性张力。
The Iran conflict shows that prediction markets can reprice war risk at extreme speed. At 1:12 a.m.
New York time on February 28, 2026, Polymarket odds on whether the US would strike Iran that day suddenly spiked; at the same time, “Yes” prices on whether Khamenei would be out in 2026 rose on both Polymarket and Kalshi. (Key numbers: 6, 24, 500,000, 400,000)
This near-instant jump indicates that platforms rapidly convert breaking military signals into probabilities, but it also amplifies pressure on rule design and market integrity. (Key numbers: 2, 2.2)