2008年雷曼兄弟倒闭前的担忧更多集中在所谓“全球储蓄过剩”上，认为亚洲高储蓄、尤其是外汇储备积累，导致美国得以高于收入消费并扩大经常账户缺口。当前重新掀起对全球失衡的讨论，IMF与欧洲智库（CEPR/Bruegel）同步关注该议题，IMF数据表明2025年全球赤字国合计经常账户缺口为全球GDP的1.6%，低于2006年的2.6%，但争议依旧高涨。

一种主张把责任归于美国财政赤字：减税或提高福利会抬高消费、压低储蓄，推高利率和美元并加深贸易逆差，财政扩张也会提升全球利率并改善他国储蓄与经常账户。另一种说法指向中国的产业政策，称补贴导致产能过剩和外溢出口，挤压他国制造业，进而让其他国家提升财政赤字。

文章指出“消费抑制”叙事也不完整：尽管养老金和“以旧换新”等转移支付上升，中国财政赤字率仍从2023年的12.8%增至2025年的14.3%，而经常账户盈余却从1.4%升到3.7%。如果中国是“元凶”，更像是政策失误——房地产融资收紧引发楼市下滑并压缩支出；且自2021年以来美国反而面对需求过剩、利率上升，当前巨额财政赤字更接近政治选择，说明全球失衡并非单因、单向责备可解。

Before Lehman Brothers’ 2008 collapse, concern centered on a “global saving glut” thesis: high Asian saving and reserve accumulation supposedly let the United States spend beyond its income, widening the current-account gap. The debate has returned, with the IMF and CEPR/Bruegel both emphasizing it, and IMF data showing deficit countries together had a 1.6% of global GDP current-account gap in 2025, down from the 2.6% peak in 2006, while political rhetoric has intensified.

One claim blames U.S. fiscal deficits: tax cuts or higher welfare spending raise consumption and lower saving, pushing up rates and the dollar while deepening the trade gap, and fiscal stimulus can also raise global rates and shift saving toward surplus countries. Another claim targets China’s industrial policy, arguing subsidies create excess capacity and export competition that crowds out other countries’ manufacturers, while CEPR’s “industrial-policy intensity” measure (from positive references in corporate earnings calls across 24 countries) tracks export growth from 2002 to 2019, yet IMF analysis notes no reliable link to current-account surpluses because policy permanence and expectations change spending responses.

The “consumption-suppression” story is also weakened by the data: China’s broad fiscal deficit rose from 12.8% of GDP in 2023 to 14.3% in 2025 even as its current-account surplus increased from 1.4% to 3.7%, and social transfers have expanded despite the claim of forced high saving. The article argues China’s role is more a policy misfire than a deliberate scheme, since a property slump triggered by tighter developer borrowing control cut domestic spending, while since 2021 the United States has faced excess demand and rising rates, making its large fiscal deficits largely a political choice; thus the causes of global imbalances are multiple and interaction-driven, not attributable to a single clear culprit.

Source: Global imbalances are back. Who’s to blame?

Subtitle: The suspects look familiar

Dateline: 4月 16, 2026 04:15 上午