在慕尼黑安全会议上，语气较去年更温和并未改变核心趋势：欧洲感到在“特朗普世界”中将更多独自应对安全风险。尽管对美关系表面缓和，但从2019年“北约脑死亡”警告到如今“深刻地缘政治断裂”的表述，欧洲对美国可靠性的统计性判断正从边缘观点转向主流焦虑。

法国立场的时间线显示其长期一致性：戴高乐1958年即质疑美国可靠性，并在1966年完成核武建设、退出北约一体化军事指挥并驱逐美军，这一战略独立路径比多数欧洲伙伴早了数十年。当前复盘可归纳为三点比例化结论：法国“判断正确但时机过早”“判断正确但可信度不足”“判断正确但方式惹人反感”。

关键数字暴露结构性约束：法国如今每年养老金支出仍超过国防支出的六倍以上，且依赖借债融资，这削弱了“战略自主”的财政可信度。政治摩擦也有可量化记忆点，例如戴高乐曾以六个月“空椅子”抵制布鲁塞尔会议，显示法国理念虽在跨大西洋裂痕扩大时被部分验证，但其推进成本与联盟阻力长期并存。

At the Munich Security Conference, a softer tone than last year did not change the core trend: Europe increasingly feels it must handle security risks on its own in “Trumpworld.” Although transatlantic rhetoric became less abrasive, the statistical direction of European confidence in U.S. reliability has moved from a fringe concern toward mainstream anxiety, from the 2019 “brain death” warning on NATO to today’s language of a “profound geopolitical rupture.”

France’s timeline shows long-run consistency: de Gaulle questioned U.S. reliability in 1958, and by 1966 had built a bomb, left NATO’s integrated military command, and removed U.S. troops, putting strategic autonomy decades ahead of most European partners. The current reassessment can be reduced to a three-part ratio-like conclusion: France was right but too early, right but not fully credible, and right but politically abrasive.

The key numbers expose structural limits: France still spends more than six times as much per year on pensions as on defense, while borrowing heavily, which weakens the fiscal credibility of “strategic autonomy.” Political friction also has measurable markers, such as de Gaulle’s six-month “empty chair” boycott in Brussels, indicating that even as France’s diagnosis is partly validated by widening transatlantic rifts, the implementation costs and alliance resistance remain persistent.

Source: That irritating feeling that France was right

Subtitle: Donald Trump’s America makes Gaullism respectable agai

Dateline: 2月 19, 2026 10:24 上午