伊朗在持续的美以军事打击下仍未崩溃，其战略基于长期消耗战逻辑。自2026年2月战争升级以来，冲突已造成超过1,000人死亡，并影响燃料供应和全球能源市场。学者Vali Nasr认为，伊朗领导层相信时间站在自己一边，希望通过延长战争改变美国的战略计算，使华盛顿放弃频繁军事打击伊朗的政策。伊朗的核心目标包括解除制裁、迫使以色列撤出黎巴嫩以及削弱美国在海湾地区的军事基地存在。

伊朗内部政治也因战争发生变化。新任最高领袖Mojtaba Khamenei在领导层更替后获得权力，其与革命卫队关系密切，并受到家人在战争中死亡的象征性影响。尽管国内长期存在对政权的不满，战争改变了政治议题，将社会分裂从“支持或反对政权”转向“支持或反对战争”。这种外部压力在短期内强化民族主义，使部分反政府民众暂时支持国家防御。

长期结构性因素也影响伊朗的战略选择。伊朗革命以来已持续约47年处于各种形式的冲突环境，并形成高度自给自足的军事能力，包括自主生产导弹和无人机。2015年核协议被美国退出后，“极限施压”制裁导致约20%的中产阶级在两年内跌入贫困线，使社会更加激进化。Nasr认为在当前安全压力下，伊朗未来可能更倾向发展核武器或将核计划转向更加隐秘和军事化。

Iran has not collapsed despite sustained US and Israeli military pressure, reflecting a strategy built around endurance in a prolonged conflict. Since the escalation of war in February 2026, more than 1,000 people have been killed and fuel infrastructure and global energy markets have been affected. Scholar Vali Nasr argues that Iranian leaders believe time favors them and that extending the war could alter Washington’s strategic calculations and discourage repeated military strikes against Iran. Tehran’s objectives include sanctions relief, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and reducing the US military presence across the Gulf.

Domestic politics in Iran have also shifted under wartime conditions. The new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has consolidated authority following leadership changes and maintains strong ties with the Revolutionary Guard while gaining symbolic legitimacy after the deaths of close family members during the conflict. Although dissatisfaction with the regime remains widespread, the war has reframed political divisions from support or opposition to the government toward support or opposition to the war itself. External pressure has therefore temporarily strengthened nationalist sentiment and encouraged even some regime critics to support national defense.

Longer-term structural factors shape Iran’s strategic outlook. Since the 1979 revolution the country has spent roughly 47 years under various forms of conflict and sanctions, leading to a highly self-reliant military sector capable of producing missiles and drones domestically. After the United States withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement and imposed maximum-pressure sanctions, about 20% of Iran’s middle class reportedly fell below the poverty line within two years, hardening political attitudes. Nasr suggests that under current security pressures Iran may move closer to developing nuclear weapons or shift its nuclear program toward more secretive and militarized forms.