支出成长正在转化为兵力结构。China 现在拥有全球最大的海上作战舰队，造舰速度快于美国，并已展示核三位一体的三条投射腿。风险暴露正在多个战区扩大：Taiwan、South China Sea、East China Sea，以及与 India 的喜马拉雅边境；同时出现反复的中日海上摩擦，以及在 Australia 与 New Zealand 附近的实弹演训。官方预算科目也未完整涵盖部分胁迫能力，包括准军事与海上执法工具，例如 China Coast Guard，这使同口径比较更复杂。
这个时间点在政治与军事上都很关键。Xi Jinping 将 PLA 现代化绑定到 2027 年（PLA 百年）以及 21st Party Congress 前的更广泛权力整合；外界普遍预期他将寻求第四任，可能把执政延伸至 2032 年。近期清洗虽强化控制，但也移除了部分具实战公信力的指挥官，而外部分析者仍质疑 PLA 在 2027 年前执行复杂 Taiwan 行动的备战程度。Beijing 正在重金投资 AI 以弥补有限的战场经验，因此核心趋势不是单一年度增幅，而是区域军事平衡的复利式位移。
China’s published defense budget was about US$245 billion in 2025 and is likely to rise another 7% in 2026, while Washington spent roughly US$900 billion. The key statistic is undercount risk: the US Department of Defense estimates Beijing’s real spending may be 40% to 90% above the official figure, implying an effective level near US$343-466 billion. The long trend is steeper than the headline gap suggests: China moved from about one-sixth of US defense spending in 2012 to about one-third by 2024, and now spends around 5x Japan and nearly 7x South Korea.
Spending growth is translating into force structure. China now fields the world’s largest maritime fighting force, builds warships faster than the US, and has demonstrated all three legs of a nuclear triad. Risk exposure is widening across multiple theaters: Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and the Himalayan border with India, with repeated China-Japan maritime incidents and live-fire drills near Australia and New Zealand. Official budget lines also omit parts of coercive capacity, including paramilitary and maritime law-enforcement tools such as the China Coast Guard, which complicates like-for-like comparisons.
Timing matters politically and militarily. Xi Jinping has tied PLA modernization to 2027 (the PLA centenary) and to broader power consolidation ahead of the 21st Party Congress, where he is widely expected to seek a fourth term that could extend rule to 2032. Recent purges tightened control but removed some commanders with combat credibility, while external analysts still question PLA readiness for complex Taiwan operations by 2027. Beijing is investing heavily in AI to offset limited battlefield experience, so the central trend is not a single annual increase but a compounding shift in regional military balance.