Gateway 的预期功能包括：作为载人与机器人出动任务的集结节点、研究平台，以及火星相关系统的技术测试平台；共有 4 个非美国伙伴参与：CSA、ESA、JAXA，以及阿联 Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre。产业执行已相当推进：Northrop Grumman 正在建造 HALO，Maxar 正在建造 PPE，ESA 提供 IHAB 以及加注与通讯系统，加拿大交付 Canadarm3，阿联提供气闸舱，日本提供生命维持与居住硬体，且已有相当比例硬体交付以进行整合与测试。支持者认为这种分散式架构可降低单一国家负担并提升计划韧性；批评者则认为 Artemis 任务可在没有轨道前哨的情况下推进，且 Gateway 最初的论据相较成本与进度压力已减弱。
其战略比较基准是 ISS 约 25 年的纪录：来自 26 个国家的超过 290 人，以及超过 4,000 项实验，并且目标在 2030 年转向新的近地轨道太空站。本文主张，Gateway 可在月球复制这种稳定联盟的作用，特别是在中国与俄罗斯推进竞争性的 International Lunar Research Station 之际，因此若在没有硬体再利用方案下取消，将造成超出沉没成本的地缘政治与产业损失。其核心含义是有条件的：若 Gateway 对美国而言不再是技术或运作上的最佳方案，则应透过明确界定的替代架构（例如月表、火星整合，或其他深空平台）保留等效的多国效益，以避免流失长期影响力、信任与伙伴动能。
The article examines whether NASA’s Lunar Gateway, a modular station planned to orbit the Moon under Artemis, is necessary for scientific, commercial, and strategic goals tied to sustained lunar presence and eventual Mars missions. The project became politically contested when the US president’s proposed 2026 NASA budget sought cancellation, though Senate resistance preserved funding, leaving its long-term status uncertain. Gateway is framed not just as infrastructure, but as the central multinational element of Artemis, where US policy choices directly affect alliance credibility and leadership in deep-space governance.
Gateway’s intended functions are a staging node for crewed and robotic sorties, a research platform, and a technology testbed for Mars-relevant systems, with contributions from 4 non-US partners: CSA, ESA, JAXA, and the UAE’s Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre. Industrial execution is already advanced: Northrop Grumman is building HALO, Maxar is building PPE, ESA is providing IHAB plus refueling and communications systems, Canada is delivering Canadarm3, the UAE an airlock, and Japan life-support and habitation hardware, with a substantial share already delivered for integration and testing. Supporters argue this distributed architecture lowers single-nation burden and improves program resilience, while critics argue Artemis missions can proceed without an orbital outpost and that Gateway’s original rationale has weakened relative to cost and schedule pressure.
The strategic benchmark is the ISS record over about 25 years: more than 290 people from 26 countries and more than 4,000 experiments, with transition to new low-Earth-orbit stations targeted for 2030. The article argues Gateway could replicate that stabilizing coalition role at the Moon, especially as China and Russia advance a competing International Lunar Research Station, so cancellation without a hardware-reuse plan would create geopolitical and industrial losses beyond sunk cost. Its core implication is conditional: if Gateway is no longer technically or operationally optimal for the US, equivalent multinational benefits should be preserved via a clearly defined alternative architecture (for example lunar-surface, Mars-integrated, or another deep-space platform) to avoid losing long-horizon influence, trust, and partnership momentum.