近期事件凸显了这种杠杆：在 February 5, 2026，乌克兰国防部长表示，Musk 打击未经授权的 Starlink 使用后，俄军部队面临「disaster」，而 Musk 也曾把 Starlink 形容为乌克兰军事通讯的「backbone」；文章并引述报导称，2022 年乌克兰推进期间 Starlink 存取曾被切断。战事之外，SpaceX 曾试图透过在伊朗一次为期数日的断网期间提供免费 Starlink、以及在委内瑞拉一场涉及 Nicolas Maduro 的美国扣押事件后提供服务，来对抗国家层级的封锁，有时还伴随或受制于与 President Donald Trump 相关的压力或触发。文中提到 Starlink 在 2024 年曾在巴西对 X 的禁令前以威胁不遵从作为回应、其后又让步，并指出有报导称，美国的 influence-peddling 被用来推动 Starlink 的市场准入。
在数字层面，专栏认为欧洲真正的差距在规模与创新，而非照抄 SpaceX 约 $22 billion 的政府合约：据称，欧洲上市卫星公司合计企业价值低于 €10 billion，其中 Eutelsat 市值约 €2.5 billion，尽管其获得主权支持，例如 €1 billion 的出口融资与商业合约。欧洲火箭被描述为已需要数亿欧元补贴，仍缺乏可重复使用能力与近地轨道主导地位，而欧洲被描绘为在时间上落后 Musk 多年、在资金上落后数十亿美元。文章主张，像 OneWeb 与 EU 支持的 IRIS²（目标在 2030 前全面投入运作）这类分散计划应予整合；并认为终止「geographic return」等政策改变，可把资金分配从按出资比例转向按技术品质，因为即使某位近乎 trillionaire 的个人行动与欧洲利益一致，对其依赖仍是战略风险。
The column argues that Europe’s scramble to counter Elon Musk’s SpaceX is best understood as a geopolitical power shift, with leaders seeking alternatives to what is framed as a $1.5 trillion SpaceX empire spanning satellites, rockets, and AI. It criticizes French President Emmanuel Macron’s focus on “over-subsidization” as the main explanation for US success and instead calls for a broader allied coalition with greater financial scale. The stakes are illustrated by Starlink’s thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit at about 340 miles altitude, giving Musk unusual leverage over global high-speed internet access and, by extension, political influence.
Recent episodes highlight that leverage: on February 5, 2026, Ukraine’s defense minister said Russian troops faced “disaster” after Musk cracked down on unauthorized Starlink use, while Musk has described Starlink as the “backbone” of Ukrainian military communications; the piece also cites reports that Starlink access was cut in 2022 during a Ukrainian advance. Beyond war, SpaceX has tried to counter state shutdowns by offering free Starlink in Iran during a days-long blackout and in Venezuela after a US seizure involving Nicolas Maduro, sometimes alongside pressure or prompting tied to President Donald Trump. It notes Starlink’s willingness in 2024 to threaten noncompliance with a Brazilian ban on X before relenting, and points to reporting that US influence-peddling has been used to push Starlink market access.
On numbers, the column suggests Europe’s real gap is scale and innovation rather than mirroring SpaceX’s roughly $22 billion in government contracts: listed European satellite firms together are said to have under €10 billion in combined enterprise value, with Eutelsat at about €2.5 billion market value, despite receiving sovereignty support such as €1 billion in export finance and commercial contracts. European rockets are described as already needing hundreds of millions of euros in subsidies while still lacking reusability and low-orbit dominance, and Europe is depicted as years and billions of dollars behind Musk. It argues that fragmented projects like OneWeb and the EU-backed IRIS² (targeted to be fully operational by 2030) should be consolidated, and that policy changes like ending “geographic return” could shift funding from contribution-based allocation to technology quality, because dependence on a near-trillionaire individual is a strategic risk even when his actions align with European interests.