对伊朗战争暴露的最新断层线是海上贸易与安全：霍尔木兹海峡被封锁，加之迪拜港口遭袭，以及对Houthi武装可能在红海追加袭击的担忧，使该地区全球航运与关键能源运输几近停滞。其结果表明，美国乃至世界仍未准备好在地缘经济冲击下全球贸易被迅速破坏的现实。鉴于这一“剧情”已上演近30年（原文：almost three decades）——1999年台湾地震冲击芯片供应、2011年日本海啸令汽车供应链中断数月、新冠疫情造成多重卡点、乌克兰战争推升食品与能源通胀——如今Donald Trump在缺乏前瞻规划的情况下又带来以石油为核心的“最大冲击”。

一个约100年历史（原文：century-old）的《Jones Act》规定，仅允许美国建造并悬挂美国旗的船舶在美国港口间运输；Donald Trump上周被迫豁免该法，意在通过允许外国船舶参与沿岸运输来暂时压低因伊朗战争而上升的油气运输成本与价格，但实际效果未明。Vanderbilt University在2026年的白皮书指出，该法所保护的市场若无重大改革与公共投资，无法推动实现全球竞争力所需的产业复兴；该法反而激励运营商修理旧船，因为新船成本高达外国建造船舶的3–8倍（原文：three to eight times）。研究同时警告，废除该法虽有短期收益，却会通过促使运营商购买更便宜且受国家补贴的外国船削弱制造基础并加剧长期脆弱性；在该法覆盖之外，行业已被中国船舶主导，而核心问题在于政府未能以跨越多年乃至数十年（原文：years and decades）的承销与持续需求信号来重建公私造船联动。

该法律的历史背景是20世纪初美国对外国航运卡特尔的危险依赖；据当时美国航运委员会负责人Edward Hurley，相关企业的垄断力量曾将关键物资运价推高至最高20倍（原文：20 times）。这一逻辑与当下航运高度集中相呼应：MSC、Maersk、Cosco、Hapag-Lloyd等少数集团控制全球运力的90%（原文：90 per cent），而全球货物的90%（原文：90 per cent）经由海运，由更少但更大的船舶承载，从而形成强调“效率”而非韧性的体系；在新战争形态下，一架廉价的伊朗无人机即可在数分钟内（原文：minutes）击毁油轮。若“船舶就是新的芯片”，美国需重塑激励与监管，减少巨型油轮与护卫舰，转向更灵活的军民两用船并与伙伴协作；霍尔木兹海峡的事实性关闭也可能加速对替代航线（如北极）的寻求，因为在大国冲突时代，灵活性即安全。

The war with Iran has exposed a new faultline in maritime trade and security: the Strait of Hormuz has been blocked, ports in Dubai have been attacked, and there are fears that Houthi forces could expand strikes in the Red Sea, bringing regional shipping and critical energy transport close to a halt. The episode shows that neither the US nor the world is prepared for how fast geoeconomic disruption can compromise global trade. This is striking after almost three decades (original: almost three decades) of warnings—1999 Taiwan’s earthquake disrupting chips, the 2011 Japan tsunami stalling auto supply chains for months, Covid-era snarls, and Ukraine-war-driven food and energy inflation—yet Donald Trump is now delivering an oil-centered “mother of all shocks” with little forward planning.

A roughly century-old (original: century-old) Jones Act requires US-built and US-flagged ships for trade between American ports; Trump waived it last week to allow foreign vessels to move oil and gas domestically and to temper prices that have jumped with the Iran war, though the effect may be marginal. A 2026 Vanderbilt University white paper argues the protected market cannot restore global competitiveness without major overhaul and public investment; it incentivizes repairing old US-flagged ships because new builds cost three to eight times (original: three to eight times) as much as foreign vessels. The paper also warns repeal yields short-term gains but greater long-term fragility as operators buy cheaper, state-subsidized foreign ships, hollowing out manufacturing; outside the act, Chinese ships dominate, and the deeper fix is sustained demand signals and underwriting over years and decades (original: years and decades) to reconnect public and private shipbuilding.

The law originally responded to early-20th-century US dependence on foreign shipping cartels; as Edward Hurley noted, monopoly power pushed charter and freight rates up to 20× (original: 20 times). That dynamic echoes today: MSC, Maersk, Cosco, Hapag-Lloyd and a few others control 90% of global capacity (original: 90 per cent), while 90% of goods move by sea (original: 90 per cent) on fewer, larger vessels—an efficiency-first system that is brittle when a cheap Iranian drone can disable a tanker in minutes (original: minutes). If ships are “the new chips,” the US must rethink incentives toward more nimble, dual-use vessels, likely with partners, and the effective closure of Hormuz may accelerate interest in alternatives such as Arctic routes, where flexibility becomes safety.