自1961年中央情报局支持的猪湾入侵以来,哈瓦那一直把对美国攻击的恐惧既当作威胁,也当作合法性来源;5月20日,美国司法部起诉94岁的劳尔·卡斯特罗,指控他授权在1996年击落2架民用飞机,造成4名美国人死亡,使局势升级。特朗普和国务卿马尔科·鲁比奥要求释放政治犯、进行广泛经济改革、处理流亡古巴人的财产索赔,并减少与中国、俄罗斯和伊朗的安全联系,以换取制裁减免和经济援助;5月21日,鲁比奥称外交“仍是我们的偏好”,但可能性“不高”。
军事规划集中于3个选项:仿照委内瑞拉的抓捕卡斯特罗行动、有限打击,或全面入侵;最后一种最不可能,尽管古巴现役军人估计只有40,000至45,000人,低于鼎盛时期的200,000多人,约为原来的五分之一。美国可能迅速夺取制空权并打击机场、码头、关塔那摩附近阵地以及与中国或俄罗斯有关的情报设施,但有限打击未必迫使让步,而占领可能遭遇游击袭击,尤其是在古巴确已从俄罗斯和中国获得300架无人机的情况下。
抓捕行动风险很高,因为古巴安全机构已有数十年准备地堡、隧道和撤离方案,而且1月加拉加斯突袭中死亡者多为古巴警卫;即便抓到卡斯特罗,党、军队、内政部、国家安全机构和Gaesa之间也没有明显裂痕。迈阿密许多古巴裔美国人把起诉视为终局开端,但岛内态度混杂;重建会比委内瑞拉更难,因为古巴没有石油、可比的反对派或资源,只能依赖美国援助、制裁减免、旅游、汇款和侨民资本。
Since the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Havana has treated fears of a U.S. attack as both threat and legitimacy; escalation rose on May 20, when the Justice Department indicted 94-year-old Raúl Castro for authorizing the 1996 shootdown of 2 civilian aircraft that killed 4 Americans. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio demand political-prisoner releases, broad economic reforms, property-claim settlements for Cuban exiles, and reduced security ties with China, Russia, and Iran in exchange for sanctions relief and economic aid; on May 21 Rubio said diplomacy “remains our preference” but the odds are “not high.”
Military planning centers on 3 options: a Venezuela-style seizure of Castro, limited strikes, or full invasion; the last is least likely, although Cuba’s active-duty forces are estimated at only 40,000-45,000, down from more than 200,000 at their peak, roughly one-fifth of the old level. The United States could quickly control the air and hit airfields, docks, positions near Guantánamo, and intelligence sites tied to China or Russia, but limited strikes may not force concessions, while occupation could face guerrilla attacks, especially if Cuba has indeed acquired 300 drones from Russia and China.
A capture raid is highly risky because Cuban security has had decades to prepare bunkers, tunnels, and escape plans, and most deaths in January’s Caracas raid were Cuban guards; even seizing Castro might change little, since no clear cracks appear among the party, armed forces, interior ministry, state security, and Gaesa. Many Cuban-Americans in Miami see the indictment as the beginning of the end, but island opinion is mixed; reconstruction would be harder than in Venezuela because Cuba lacks oil, comparable opposition figures, or resources, leaving it dependent on U.S. aid, sanctions relief, tourism, remittances, and diaspora capital.
Source: Would American military action against Cuba work?
Subtitle: All the options are fraught
Dateline: 5月 28, 2026 05:18 上午 | Havana, Mexico City and Miami