这篇文章指出，中国在中东作为权力掮客的上升势头在 2026 年初明显放缓：尽管 2023 年 3 月 Iran 与 Saudi Arabia 在 Beijing 通过秘密谈判同意恢复外交关系，一度被视为美国影响力相对退却的“标志性时刻”，但自 2023 年 10 月 7 日 Hamas 袭击引发 Israel 在 Gaza 的战争及其外溢冲突以来，关键停火斡旋与危机管控主要由美国（并与 Egypt、Qatar 等）主导，而 Beijing 在需要持续政治与安全投入的议题上普遍缺席。文章并提到 2026 年 1 月 Iran 的暴力动荡与网络封锁等事件，进一步削弱了 Beijing 在其“最重要地区战略伙伴”处的影响力。Michael Singh 与 Mona Yacoubian 等受访者的核心判断是：与 2023 年前后相比，外界对“中国挑战”的关注正在减弱，因为 China 更不愿意为地区安全与政治结果投入资源与政治资本。

文章同时强调 China 在中东的影响力长期以能源与贸易为轴心：China 于 1993 年成为净石油进口国后加深对海湾依赖，并在 2013 年 Xi Jinping 推出 Belt and Road Initiative 后进一步扩展到基建、通信与新能源等领域。最具量化的证据之一是，China 与 Arab League 成员的双边贸易额从 2004 年的 370 亿美元（US$37 billion）增长至 2023 年接近 4000 亿美元（nearly US$400 billion），约为原来的 10.8 倍；在安全层面，Chinese navy 自 2008 年起参与索马里外海反海盗巡逻，并于 2017 年在 Djibouti 设立首个海外军事基地。政治与舆论数据也被用于描绘“窗口期”：China 与 Iran 于 2021 年签署 25 年伙伴关系；Arab Barometer 的 2022 年民调显示，在中东与北非受访的 9 个国家中，有 8 个国家对 China 的全球形象好感度高于美国；与此同时，美国自 2011 年提出“pivot to Asia”以及 2021 年自阿富汗撤军等事件加剧了盟友对其可靠性的疑虑，且 UAE 在 2022 年 1 月遭导弹与无人机袭击后的沟通细节（涉及 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 与 Brett McGurk）被用来说明这种担忧。

在 2023 年 10 月 7 日之后，China 的多项“政治存在感”尝试被描述为象征性而非决定性：例如 2024 年 7 月 China 在 Beijing 接待 14 个巴勒斯坦派别并宣布《Beijing Declaration》，但很快被多方视为姿态；在红海民用航运遭 Houthi 袭击时，美国组织海上联盟并对 Yemen 目标实施打击，而 Beijing 主要聚焦于中国关联船只的安全。技术与资本链条也出现逆转：Abu Dhabi 的 AI 公司 G42 在美国压力下拆解与 Huawei 等的部分关系，并于 2024 年 4 月宣布获得 Microsoft 15 亿美元（US$1.5 billion）投资。尽管如此，文章强调经济联系仍强：依据 Asia House 数据，2024 年海湾与 China 的贸易额达到 2570 亿美元（US$257 billion），并超过海湾与美国、英国及欧元区合计的贸易额；但总体结论是，在 President Donald Trump 领导下美国重新强化地区主导后，外界更倾向认为 China 缺乏作为安全担保者的经验与意愿，其影响力短期更可能继续以商业与基础设施网络为主，而非持续的地缘政治与安全领导。

The article argues that China’s brief “Middle East moment” has stalled by early 2026: although the March 2023 Iran–Saudi Arabia agreement to restore diplomatic ties in Beijing looked like a landmark sign of US influence receding, China has largely stepped back from major regional crises. Since the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks and the ensuing Gaza war and wider escalation, the US has remained central—often alongside Egypt and Qatar—while Beijing has shown little willingness to spend sustained political capital or resources when security outcomes are at stake. The piece also cites Iran’s violent unrest in January 2026 as another blow to China’s top regional strategic partner relationship. Analysts such as Michael Singh and Mona Yacoubian conclude that concern about China replacing the US as a leading broker is waning because China appears reluctant to act as a durable political or security guarantor.

It emphasizes that China’s regional footprint is still anchored in energy and commerce. China became a net oil importer in 1993, and the Gulf’s role expanded further after Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Quantitatively, two-way trade between China and Arab League members rose from US$37 billion in 2004 to nearly US$400 billion in 2023 (about a 10.8× increase). Security and political ties grew as well: the Chinese navy joined anti-piracy patrols off Somalia from 2008, and Beijing opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017; China also signed a 25-year partnership with Iran in 2021. Public-opinion and alliance-confidence data frame the opportunity China once had: Arab Barometer’s 2022 polling found China viewed more favorably than the US in 8 of 9 surveyed countries, while the US “pivot to Asia” starting in 2011 and the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021 fed doubts about American reliability, sharpened by the UAE’s January 2022 strike episode involving Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and Brett McGurk.

Post–Oct. 7, the article portrays China’s political initiatives as mostly symbolic and its crisis role as narrow. In July 2024, China hosted 14 Palestinian factions and announced the Beijing Declaration, but key actors dismissed it, and in the Red Sea shipping crisis Beijing focused mainly on the safety of Chinese-linked vessels while Washington led a naval coalition and strikes in Yemen. Technology and investment ties also shifted under US pressure: Abu Dhabi AI firm G42 unwound parts of its China-linked stack and, in April 2024, announced a US$1.5 billion Microsoft investment. Even with these setbacks, economics remain large: Asia House estimates Gulf–China trade reached US$257 billion in 2024, exceeding Gulf trade with the US, the UK, and the Eurozone combined. The overall conclusion is that the US—reinforced under President Donald Trump—still sets the decisive security and diplomatic agenda, while China’s influence is more likely to keep growing commercially than through sustained geopolitical leadership.