文章判断短期选举代价未必明显，理由是外政策略通常不是投票主因：2024年总统选举的出口民调仅有4%选民称外交政策是最重要议题。例外情境是美军投入战斗并承受伤亡：Vietnam战争的反对声浪在1960年代末侵蚀Lyndon Johnson支持度；近约40年后，Iraq占领战的幻灭感也削弱George W. Bush。Jeremy Rosner的说法是，只要「美军没有被杀」，公众往往给予政府在外交上「很大的行动许可」。但文中同时指出，外交仍会透过「领导力评价」影响选举：推翻Taliban与Iraq战初期强化Bush的强势与决断形象；相对地，Afghanistan撤离被描述为不可逆地刺破Joe Biden在2020年竞选中受重视的稳健 компетence 形象。
调查列出对Trump的具体风险，集中在政策支持度的数字落差：仅16%认为关税是推进美国利益的有效方式；仅21%认为以扩张美国领土作为动用军队的合适用途；以武力取得Greenland或Canada的支持各约5%。对Ukraine援助则是「超过五分之三」支持延续。其偏向19世纪「势力范围」的构想在民意中更弱：仅14%认为适用于Asia，仅7%认为适用于Europe。相对地，传统国际主义指标仍高：有「五分之三」同意美国应积极参与世界事务；「三分之二」认为应透过United Nations行动，即使需要妥协；几乎「四分之三」主张对NATO「更」投入。文章并强调两党分歧下仍存在跨党派多数（含多数共和党选民）支持积极全球角色与NATO，并普遍反对「同盟主要让他国受益」的论述；整体风险在于外交破裂强化「失序与混乱」的领导观感，并与国内动荡相互加乘。
The piece frames President Donald Trump’s second term as a stress test of public tolerance for turmoil: allies recoil from his shock to international affairs while thousands protest disorder at home. It cites a rare retreat in Minnesota this week as evidence the administration recognizes its mass-deportation program, as currently designed, has crossed a line most of the public will not follow; and it pairs that with a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey released on January 28, 2026 (GMT+8) indicating Trump is going far beyond what most Americans want in dismantling the alliance-based order built after World War II. Drawing on Chicago Council polling since 1974, the article emphasizes continuity: majorities across parties support an active U.S. role, U.S. alliances, and an overseas military presence; most also view trade as good, back NATO, and support intervening if allies are attacked—principles Trump rejects through threats to allies, scorn for NATO, outreach to dictators, and unilateral tariffs. Ivo Daalder compresses the shift into dates, arguing Pax Americana was born on December 7, 1941 and died on January 20, 2025.
It argues the near-term electoral impact may be limited because foreign policy rarely drives vote choice: in the 2024 presidential exit poll, only 4% said foreign policy was the most important issue. The exception is sustained combat with U.S. casualties, where Vietnam-era resistance eroded Lyndon Johnson in the late 1960s and disillusionment with the Iraq occupation weakened George W. Bush nearly 40 years later. Democratic pollster Jeremy Rosner’s point is that absent U.S. troop deaths, the public grants administrations wide latitude on foreign policy. Yet the article insists foreign policy still matters indirectly by shaping leadership evaluations: early Afghanistan/Taliban successes and the initial Iraq phases boosted Bush’s image of strength and decisiveness, while the Afghanistan withdrawal is portrayed as irreversibly puncturing Joe Biden’s valued steadiness and competence from 2020.
The survey’s numeric findings define several risks for Trump in policy specifics and overall strategy. Only 16% call tariffs an effective tool for U.S. interests; only 21% say expanding U.S. territory is an appropriate military use; and support for using force to acquire Greenland or Canada is about 5% for each, while more than three in five want to continue aid to Ukraine. The administration’s apparent return to 19th-century spheres of influence draws scant support: 14% for Asia and 7% for Europe. Meanwhile, traditional internationalism remains strong—three-fifths favor an active global role, two-thirds prefer acting through the United Nations even with compromises, and almost exactly three-fourths want greater commitment to NATO—with notable bipartisan majorities (including most Republican voters) rejecting the claim that alliances mostly benefit other nations. The concluding risk is that global rupture reinforces a broader perception of excessive chaos, compounding domestic disorder.