中东战争正在显示这种脆弱性。中国在未登陆台湾海岸的情况下，也可能实施与德黑兰在海峡所做相似的封锁，可能让台湾在数周内陷入停电。台湾最新的国防检讨指出，中共人民解放军已扩张到能切断原料贸易的程度。前美国情报官Lonnie Henley 在 2023 年研究中写道，人民解放军（PLA）可在港口进出道和港口本体布雷、毁损港口设施与后续运输路线，并在航道中击沉或故意沉船，美国舰艇将在交火下清雷并多次护航慢速货船，每周可能重复数次。台湾的能源库存非常不足：液化天然气仅足 11 天需求，煤约 40 天，原油可支撑 90 天；一旦耗尽，战略性投降风险将急速上升。
政治，而非物理条件，似乎才是台湾安全能源的主要限制。核能在1980年代中期曾供应超过一半电力且每两年换料一次，但最后仅存的一座反应炉在5月停机，台电上个月才提出重启马鞍山厂的申请。国民党亦阻挠大型风电与太阳能，尤其在农地与近海，但空间上限的说法多半是政治化：5.4万公顷（约占农地10%）用于休闲农业，另有相近面积长期撂荒，两者加总超过目前 4,684 公顷太阳能农场面积的20倍；另有 575,000 公顷为林木种植区，且超过99%木材仍依赖进口，尽管森林总覆盖约 2.1 百万公顷（约60%）。若台湾保留既有近完成核电厂并新增四座（约 +5.6 吉瓦）依循韩国模式，核能可供应约三分之一电力；若再完成离岸风电并在 50,000 公顷闲置地区布建太阳能，进口依赖可降到20%以下。历史上，小而富裕的政治体系通常以水库与粮仓提升韧性，台湾未做到，故战时暴露仍将持续，危机或可成为改革契机。
Taiwan has unexpectedly durable defenses that can look like a porcupine in a conflict, with swampy, rocky coastlines, adult male conscription, and dual-use highways and airports hardened for war. Its main weakness is energy. About 39,000 ships call at Taiwan’s ports annually, more than the roughly 30,000 transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Around one-fifth of inbound tonnage is coal, oil, refined fuels, and natural gas, which power 85% of the grid and 99% of road vehicles. Most of this trade enters through only a few ports, many only 130 kilometers—about 80 miles—from mainland China.
The Middle East war shows this vulnerability clearly. China could impose a blockade from sea, similar to what Tehran has practiced in the Strait, without landing forces on Taiwan’s shores, and leave the island without power within weeks. Taiwan’s latest defense review says the PLA has expanded enough to cut raw-material trade. In a 2023 study, former U.S. intelligence officer Lonnie Henley said PLA forces could mine port approaches and the ports themselves, damage port facilities and onward transport routes, and sink or scuttle vessels in shipping channels; that would force U.S. forces to clear mines under fire and repeatedly escort slow cargo ships, potentially many times each week. Taiwan’s domestic stockpiles are thin: LNG for 11 days, coal for about 40 days, and oil for 90 days. Once those buffers end, the risk of capitulation rises sharply.
Political choices, not physical geography, appear to be the biggest constraint on secure energy. Nuclear power once supplied more than half of Taiwan’s electricity in the mid-1980s and required refueling every two years, but only one reactor remained and it shut in May; Taipower only applied last month to restart Maanshan. The Kuomintang has also blocked large wind and solar buildout, especially on farmland and at sea. Yet land limits are overplayed: 54,000 hectares—about 10% of farmland—are used for agritourism and a similar area is permanently fallow, together over 20 times the 4,684 hectares currently in solar farms. Another 575,000 hectares are planted forest, while over 99% of timber is still imported although forests cover about 2.1 million hectares (60%). If Taiwan had kept its mostly complete nuclear plants and added four more (about +5.6 GW), nuclear could provide roughly one-third of generation; if offshore wind and 50,000 hectares of new solar were added, import dependence could drop below 20%. In history, small rich states often build resilience through reserves and self-sufficiency; Taiwan has not done so and remains exposed.