最明显的早期征兆之一出现在东南亚。ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute 2026 年调查（文中注记为 2026 年 2 月 6–9 日、每个受访国超过 2,000 人）显示，东南亚对若必须二选一时略偏向中国；同时有 51.9% 受访者把 Donald Trump 领导下的美国视为最主要地缘政治顾虑。区域政府也在能源市场波动、关税政策反复与防务支出要求下调整立场，澳洲总理 Anthony Albanese 甚至公开重申与中国的「稳定且建设性」关系。欧洲与北美也有类似对冲信号：欧洲在安全疑虑存在下仍扩大经济往来，而加拿大在关税与中国电动车相关限制上采取降档措施，显示务实转向。
北京也在制度层面推进其布局：近期游说承接国际海洋治理机制，透过 BRICS 与上海合作组织推动替代美主导规则的治理方案。基础设施融资与经济联系使其形成杠杆，国家越依赖中国越可能顺应中国偏好。作者警告，若持续发展，未来秩序可能转向以主权与稳定优先于权利与自由、民主治理被压缩，并由中国金融支持发展与地缘协调。然而限制仍在：在北京影响力上升的东南亚，几乎有一半受访者仍把南海强硬行为视为重大忧虑，且北京更像在造势的竞选阵营，而非承担全球治理完整成本的政府。对于中小国而言，短期最可能仍是对冲；在华府缺乏一致政策、重建同盟与全面再接触迹象的情况下，这个空间将继续扩大。
The article argues that China is positioning itself as a rival pole, not a revolutionary destroyer, by acting like a global opposition party to U.S. leadership. Washington’s handling of crises, especially the Iran war, has made Beijing’s mediating role more visible: as Iran’s largest trade partner, China reportedly encouraged Tehran through Pakistan mediation toward a less confrontational stance and publicly called for restraint, presenting itself as a stabilizer. The piece says China does not need to solve conflicts directly; it needs to appear constructive enough against a U.S. portrayed as unpredictable and escalatory. Even “unrealistic” peace ideas on Ukraine or the Middle East can signal that countries have a non-Western option.
The clearest early signal is in Southeast Asia. The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute 2026 survey (noted as Feb. 6–9, with over 2,000 respondents in each country, plus a side box on the U.S., Canada, UK, France and Germany) shows a slight majority in Southeast Asia leaning toward China if forced to choose, while 51.9% named American leadership under Donald Trump as their top geopolitical concern. Governments are also reacting to policy volatility in energy markets, tariffs, and defense demands; Australia’s Anthony Albanese publicly reaffirmed a “stable and constructive” relationship with China. Similar hedging appears in Europe and North America: European engagement expanded despite security concerns, and Canada reduced trade friction on tariffs and barriers affecting Chinese electric vehicles.
Beijing is also advancing at the institutional layer: it has lobbied to host international ocean governance mechanisms and promoted alternatives to U.S.-led rules through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Infrastructure financing and economic links create leverage, so states more tied to China become more likely to accommodate Chinese preferences. The author warns that continued trends could reshape order toward sovereignty and stability over rights and democracy, with Chinese finance underwriting development and coordination. Constraints remain: in Southeast Asia, which still sees gains for Beijing, nearly half of respondents treat Chinese behavior in the South China Sea as a major concern, and Beijing looks more like a campaign machine than a government bearing full global leadership costs. For medium and smaller states, hedging will likely remain the default, and with little sign of restored U.S. consistency, alliance rebuilding, or global re-engagement, the space Beijing exploits will continue to widen.