在2018年发表的一项研究中，研究者分析了2005—2011年间214家美国公司的超过50,000名员工数据，发现销售业绩越好越更可能被提拔为经理，但却预示着更差的管理质量，其新下属的业绩往往下滑，从而为“彼得原理”提供了证据。

2009年的一项计算机模拟同样显示：当晋升奖励的是前一岗位的胜任力，而新岗位需要不同技能时，组织会系统性地把人抬升到他们表现不佳的层级，这意味着在“技能不匹配”的情形下，随机晋升可能优于基于现岗表现的晋升。

其他数据也揭示了更多扭曲：在某大型制造商的德国业务中，经理会压低对高产员工的可见评级，而当团队经理即将调动、囤才动机下降时，内部岗位申请数量会激增；在北美某大型零售商，对近30,000名管理培训通道人才使用九宫格（nine-box grid）评估后发现，女性平均绩效评分更高但潜力评分更低，之后女性更常“跑赢”其潜力评分，而更高的“离职风险”与更高的潜力评分相关。

A 2018 paper analyzing data on over 50,000 workers at 214 U.S. firms from 2005–2011 found that stronger sales performance increased the probability of promotion into management, yet predicted lower managerial quality as new subordinates’ results tended to decline—evidence for the Peter principle.

A 2009 computer simulation similarly showed that when promotion rewards competence in a previous role but the next role requires different skills, organizations systematically elevate people into positions they perform poorly, implying randomized promotions can outperform merit-based ones under skill mismatch.

Other datasets show additional distortions: in the German operations of a large manufacturer, managers suppressed visible ratings of productive workers and internal job applications surged when a team’s manager was about to move and had less incentive to hoard; at a North American retailer, nearly 30,000 management-track employees were scored via the nine-box grid, where women averaged higher performance ratings but lower potential scores, later more often exceeding those potential ratings, and higher “flight risk” aligned with higher potential scores.

Source: The problem with promotions

Subtitle: The Peter principle is alive and well

Dateline: 1月 08, 2026 05:48 上午