她进一步强调，整体住房是否短缺存在争议，因住房需求取决于「家庭户数」而非人口数；近年家庭形成放缓，与子女更晚离家、结婚率与生育率下降相关。供给端还可能因人口老化而增加：自住住宅由年长者占比主导，2026年最年轻的baby boomer为62岁、最年长为80岁；未来10年估计将有1,500万名boomer死亡，并随著进入照护机构或过世释出住房。她引用对2000至2020年跨城市房价与供给限制的研究（Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco研究团队，NBER工作论文），结论是供给限制对解释房价上涨差异「不重要」，更能预测高房价的是「较高的所得成长」。研究摘要以Houston、Austin、San Francisco、Los Angeles为例：德州两市人口成长快但所得成长慢；加州两市人口成长接近平均但所得成长快；四市供给大致随人口成长调整，而加州房价上行主要来自高所得者带来的超额需求。
在她的框架中，「只要多盖」即使有效，也必须直接改善被定价排除者的可负担性；以可负担住房常用门槛「住房支出占所得30%」计算，中位数家庭每月可负担上限为2,093美元，但这已比中位数房贷月付低200美元，意味中位数房贷约为2,293美元。她因此把政策重心放在劳动市场与收入分配：提高底部与中间家庭的收入（例如提高最低工资、规范排班与休假以降低就业维持成本、协助工会化），而非仅寄望供给扩张的涓滴效应。她用长期对照收束论点：自2009年以来美国新增约1,700万个住房单位，但劳动所得占比维持平坦在59%，显示仅增加住房存量不足以扭转可负担性压力，关键在于推动更广泛的收入成长。
Kathryn Anne Edwards (Feb. 5, 2026, 6:00 PM GMT+8; same as UTC+8) examines housing affordability through the “build build build” logic: if more homes are built, prices should fall; builders are even promoting a plan for 1 million new affordable houses branded “Trump Homes” to win political support. Her central claim is that affordability is not only a supply problem but a demand-and-affordability mismatch, with demand pressures driven by income inequality: rapid income growth at the top alongside tepid or stagnant growth for the middle. She argues key macro indicators are not flashing red: the US homeownership rate fell for 11 years after the 2005 housing-bubble burst, from 69% to 62.9% in 2016, then rose to about 65%; mortgage debt service fell from a 9% peak in 2007 to under 6% now, below pre-pandemic levels.
She adds that an overall housing shortage is disputed because housing need is determined by the number of households, not people; household formation has slowed as children stay home longer and marriage and fertility rates fall. Supply is also likely to rise as the population ages: owner-occupied housing is dominated by older people, the youngest baby boomer is 62 in 2026 and the oldest is 80, and an estimated 15 million boomers will die over the next 10 years, potentially releasing units through moves to assisted living or death. Citing research from a Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco team (an NBER working paper) on 2000–2020 city outcomes, she highlights the conclusion that supply constraints are “unimportant” for explaining differences in rising house prices, while higher prices are predicted by “higher income growth.” Their summary contrasts Houston and Austin (faster-than-average population growth but slower-than-average income growth) with San Francisco and Los Angeles (average population growth but faster-than-average income growth): in all four, supply broadly tracked population growth, while California prices were pushed up by excess demand from very high earners.
In her account, even if more building helps, affordability requires that new supply be reachable by households currently priced out; using the common threshold that “affordable” means paying 30% of income, the median household can afford at most $2,093 per month, already $200 less than the median mortgage payment, implying a median mortgage near $2,293. She therefore centers labor-market and distributional policy as the route to affordability: raising incomes for bottom and middle households (e.g., higher minimum wages, shift and time-off regulation to sustain employment, and support for unionization) rather than relying on supply increases to trickle down. She closes with a long-run contrast: the US added about 17 million housing units since 2009, while labor’s share of income stayed flat at 59%, arguing that expanding housing stock alone is insufficient without broader income growth.