中国正在用非武力手段全面施压台湾，从外交、空域到心理博弈同步升温。预计下月举行 Xi Jinping 与 Donald Trump 会晤前，台北担忧出现对台不利让步。台湾总统 Lai Ching-te 前往 Eswatini（台湾最后 12 个外交盟友之一）的行程在最后一刻被取消，原因是 China 被指施压 Seychelles、Madagascar 与 Mauritius 撤回其总统专机的过境空域许可。虽中国否认，但有迹象显示其行为产生实际效果；同时，Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung 仍以特使身分抵达 Eswatini，也说明北京难以完全封锁台湾的国际活动。在此脉络下，无人机被视为核心对策，因 Taiwan 难以匹敌 China 的传统兵力与战机体量，必须以非对称方式应对。

Taiwan 虽有无人机发展蓝图，却仍在产能、节奏与供应链自主上不足。现代冲突更倾向以大量廉价系统形成压倒性使用，Patriot 或 THAAD 拦截系统每套约 4–15 百万美元，而多数攻击型无人机仅为其一小部分，China 的 Feilong-300D 报价甚至低至 10,000 美元（约 0.01 百万美元）。China 兼具全球关键零件供应与回收再利用能力，卫星影像显示其人民解放军在台海周边六个基地布置 200 余架改装为无人机的老旧战斗机。Taiwan 每年仅产约 10,000 套，距离 2028 年 180,000 套目标仍非常遥远，即便承诺未来数年取得超过 200,000 架。

台美合作在加深，但依据 CNAS 分析，Taiwan 仍需建立“非对称地狱景观”——在空中、海上与水下部署数千架层级化、协同化的无人系统，迫使 PLA 入侵成本达到难以承受。这要求预算由昂贵主力平台转向国内量产与采购，并与 Poland 等伙伴合作建立去中国依赖的韧性供应链；Taiwan 的半导体与制造底蕴提供可扩张条件，但政治僵局已拖慢国防拨款改革。Ukraine 提供了可比基准：其 2025 年据报生产约 4.5 百万架 FPV/攻击型无人机，且台乌合作使台湾对欧洲出口量增长 40 倍。若 Taipei 能加速推进，除可增强威慑效果，也可向 Washington 展示更高自我防卫承担，降低北京透过外交胁迫换取谈判优势的空间。

China is escalating non-kinetic pressure on Taiwan across diplomatic, airspace, and psychological lines. Ahead of an anticipated Xi Jinping–Donald Trump summit next month, Taipei fears that Beijing may push for dangerous compromises. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te cancelled a last-minute trip to Eswatini, one of Taiwan’s 12 remaining diplomatic allies, after reports said China pressured Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius to withdraw transit permits for the presidential aircraft. China denied the allegation, while taking indirect credit for the outcome. Taipei’s foreign minister, however, still travelled to Eswatini as envoy, showing that Beijing can strain Taiwan’s diplomacy but not fully seal it. In this environment, drones are central to Taiwan’s strategic response because Taiwan cannot match China’s conventional scale and must rely on asymmetric tools.

Taiwan has a drone plan but still lacks adequate scale, speed, and supply-chain independence. Modern conflict increasingly rewards saturation with inexpensive systems. Patriot and THAAD interceptors are estimated at 4–15 million USD each, while many attack drones cost a small fraction; China’s Feilong-300D is reported at 10,000 USD (about 0.01 million). China also dominates key components in the global drone ecosystem and recycling, and satellite analysis indicates the PLA has placed 200 or more converted fighter-to-drone aircraft across six bases near the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan produces roughly 10,000 systems per year, far below its 180,000 target for 2028, despite pledging to acquire more than 200,000 drones in coming years.

Analysts argue Taiwan needs an “asymmetric hellscape” as CNAS described: a layered, coordinated drone architecture across air, sea, and undersea to raise any PLA invasion cost to an unacceptable level. That requires shifting resources away from expensive platforms toward domestic production and procurement, and building China-independent supply chains with partners such as Poland. Taiwan’s semiconductor and manufacturing base gives it technical depth, but political gridlock has already slowed defense budget reallocation. Ukraine is presented as the clearest benchmark: it reportedly produced about 4.5 million drones in 2025, and Taiwan-Ukraine cooperation supported a 40-fold rise in Taiwanese drone exports to Europe. Faster execution could strengthen deterrence, improve credibility with Washington on self-reliance, and reduce the space for coercive diplomacy.