该文将乌克兰东部与南部描绘为一个不断扩大的、由无人机主导的「kill zone」，在那里连「可见性」本身都致命：即使距离俄军阵地 30-minute 车程也可能丧命，传统后方区域已经崩解，而移动如今取决于黑暗、浓雾或恶劣天气。第一人称视角（FPV）无人机、密集空中监视与广泛电子战，迫使部队转入地下，将前线附近的机械化运输压到接近零，并迫使其透过反热成像移动、伪装阵地、覆网道路与临时反无人机车辆装甲来适应。

在战术层面，双方都处于快速适应循环：干扰系统被航程可达 40 km（original: 40km）的光纤无人机反制，无人机伏击越来越像动态雷场，而步兵推进常以每夜数十到数百米的缓慢微移动进行。乌克兰结合分层防御工事（反坦克壕沟、铁丝网、地雷）、大规模无人机运用（每月超过 100,000 架次飞行）与低技术防御（霰弹枪、射网枪、机动反无人机小队）；同时，由于道路机动与轮换高度暴露，后勤与伤员后送正日益转向无人地面车辆。

报导所称影响严重且可量化：乌克兰官员估计无人机造成俄军战场死亡最多达 80%，称仅 12月 俄军损失即有 35,000 人，并指出在顿涅茨克前线每多夺取 1 公里需付出 156 名俄军士兵代价；个别耐久案例包括连续 471 天与 165 天未轮换（期间有 30 次接替失败）。赫尔松（Kherson）显示在持续攻击下的城市适应，在分层「drone dome」下拦截率约 95%，但在 2025 该地区仍记录 235,000 次炮击与近 100,000 次无人机攻击，超过 40,000 栋建筑被毁、至少 307 人死亡；政府控制区仅约剩 145,000 名居民（其中约 60,000 在市内），由约 100 条防护网隧道、14 处加固医疗设施与 25-150 mm 多层网格保护，资金来自 2026 地区预算约 $46 million，其中 43% 分配给防御工事，尽管仅控制 30% 领土。

The article depicts eastern and southern Ukraine as an expanding drone-dominated "kill zone" where visibility itself is lethal: even a 30-minute drive from Russian positions can be fatal, conventional rear areas have collapsed, and movement now depends on darkness, fog, or bad weather. First-person-view (FPV) drones, dense aerial surveillance, and widespread electronic warfare have pushed troops underground, reduced mechanized transport near the front to near zero, and forced adaptation through anti-thermal movement, camouflaged positions, net-covered roads, and improvised anti-drone vehicle armor.

At the tactical level, both sides are in a rapid adaptation cycle: jamming systems are countered by fibre-optic drones with ranges up to 40 km (original: 40km), drone ambushes increasingly resemble dynamic minefields, and infantry advances often occur in slow micro-movements of dozens to hundreds of meters per night. Ukraine combines layered fortifications (anti-tank ditches, wire, mines), massive drone use (more than 100,000 flights per month), and low-tech defenses (shotguns, net-firing guns, mobile anti-drone teams), while logistics and casualty evacuation increasingly shift to unmanned ground vehicles because road movement and rotation are highly exposed.

The reported effects are severe and quantifiable: Ukrainian officials estimate drones cause up to 80% of Russian battlefield deaths, claim 35,000 Russian losses in December alone, and cite a cost of 156 Russian soldiers per extra kilometer seized on the Donetsk front; individual endurance cases include 471 consecutive days and 165 days without rotation (with 30 failed relief attempts). Kherson illustrates urban adaptation under persistent attack, with about 95% drone interception under a layered "drone dome," yet in 2025 the region still recorded 235,000 shellings and nearly 100,000 drone attacks, with over 40,000 buildings destroyed and at least 307 killed; only about 145,000 residents remain in government-held areas (around 60,000 in the city), protected by roughly 100 net tunnels, 14 shielded medical facilities, and multilayer mesh of 25-150 mm, funded from a 2026 regional budget of about $46 million with 43% allocated to fortifications despite control of only 30% of the territory.