US-Israel 对伊朗的战争凸显价值数十亿美元的网际网路实体骨干之脆弱性：冲突开始以来，波斯湾地区至少 3 座资料中心遭无人机攻击，云端服务因此中断。2024 年初，红海一艘遭攻击后被弃置的船只漂流近 2 周（约 14 天）时以锚拖曳海床，切断 3 条网际网路电缆；修复耗时 5 个月，部分原因是必须与受国际制裁的叛军周旋以取得在叶门水域施工的法律许可，导致红海原计划新增至少 5 条电缆（曾是欧亚之间最直接且成本最低的路径）至今仍在搁置。
虽无证据显示伊朗已在 Hormuz 海峡布雷，但 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 透过发布「危险区域」地图等方式制造威慑；美军迄今在波斯湾摧毁 16 艘伊朗布雷船。历史上，第二次世界大战期间波罗的海与北海投下数十万枚水雷，80 多年后仍需例行扫描海床并以水下机器人复核；若发现弹药，可能改道、移除或引爆，但单次引爆作业成本可达数十万美元，且常因海床废金属提高调查费用。因波斯湾缺乏类似二战的精确布雷纪录、未爆飞弹与无人机位置不明且可能更不稳定，区域业者转向更昂贵的陆缆或混合路径：IQ Group 提供 UAE 经 Saudi Arabia 或 Kuwait、Iraq、Turkey 连到欧洲的陆上线路，Neqsol Holding 另以 Kazakhstan 与 Azerbaijan 连接欧亚；但 IQ Group 的 Asoz Rashid 表示在攻击与供应受阻下，建设速度仅约战前的 50%，并改以 Turkey 陆路运入缆材，而 Neptune P2P Group 也评估为船舶加装可侦测、干扰或击落无人机的机动反制系统。
The Ile de Batz was installing part of a 28,000-mile (about 45,000 km; original figure 28,000-mile) subsea internet cable meant to link Europe to Asia via the Persian Gulf when war in Iran halted work in early March. The owner declared force majeure and sent the vessel back to port in Saudi Arabia, where it has remained stranded; at least two other high-capacity cable projects in the region are also paused indefinitely. Even if a permanent ceasefire enables a restart, funders will likely need to rescan sections of seabed with magnetic and acoustic sensors because unexploded missiles and mines may lie along planned routes, and consultant Hasnain Ali expects delays for almost all such projects.
The US-Israel war on Iran has highlighted how fragile the internet’s multibillion-dollar physical backbone can be: since the conflict began, at least three Gulf data centers have been hit by drone strikes, disrupting cloud services. In early 2024, an abandoned ship in the Red Sea drifted for almost two weeks (about 14 days), dragging its anchor and slicing three internet cables before sinking; repairs took five months partly because firms had to navigate legal hurdles to negotiate with internationally sanctioned rebels before working in Yemeni waters. Since then, plans to install at least five additional Red Sea cables—once the most direct and cost-effective Europe–Asia route—have remained on hold.
Although there is no confirmed Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has sought to create that perception, while the US military has destroyed 16 Iranian minelaying vessels in the Persian Gulf so far. Northern Europe shows mine risks can persist: hundreds of thousands of mines were laid in the Baltic and North seas during World War II, and more than 80 years later projects still scan seabeds and use robots to inspect hazards; if munitions are found, routes may be changed or ordnance moved or detonated, with single detonations costing hundreds of thousands of dollars and scrap metal driving up survey costs. In the Gulf, weaker historical records and potentially more volatile modern munitions raise uncertainty, pushing interest toward costlier overland or hybrid routes such as IQ Group’s UAE–Saudi Arabia/Kuwait–Iraq–Turkey corridor and Neqsol Holding’s Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan link, even as IQ Group CEO Asoz Rashid says Iraq’s instability has cut build pace to about 50% and Neptune P2P Group considers mobile anti-drone defenses for ships.