2020–22年在提格雷的内战可能导致数十万人的死亡；一项由美国及其盟友在2022年11月促成的停火协议在三年后实际上已崩溃。11月7日，TPLF指责总理阿比·艾哈迈德的政府通过对提格雷目标发动无人机袭击公开违反协议，此前在阿法尔发生冲突；阿比已停止对提格雷的联邦资金。官员警告动员：军方领导人称必须消灭TPLF，提格雷将军声称已准备好作战，梅克勒居民在银行排队取款并储备物资。
三项因素使风险高于2020年。首先，TPLF内部出现分裂：三月一个派系罢黜了一位临时总统并任命一名将军，促使不满的士兵在阿法尔组建了一个反TPLF民兵，得到联邦政府的秘密支持，导致频繁小规模冲突。第二，埃塞俄比亚与厄立特里亚关系恶化：厄立特里亚在2020年派出数万部队；双方领导人现在互视为主要对手。阿比——领导一个约1.3亿人口的内陆国家——公开寻求厄立特里亚的港口；官员访问了Bure，距离阿萨布70公里，卫星图像显示附近的无人机基地有扩建。第三，苏丹内战将各方联系起来：数千名提格雷人曾与苏丹军并肩作战，厄立特里亚在训练苏丹军单位。
盟友重组使局势更复杂：阿姆哈拉的Fano民兵在2020年曾与埃塞一同作战，2023年起义并在九月下旬的一次攻势中在东阿姆哈拉击溃政府部队，据称得到了厄立特里亚和TPLF的帮助。来自提格雷、阿姆哈拉、厄立特里亚和奥罗米亚的指挥官曾在苏丹会面。外部支持者（阿联酋、埃及）利益相互冲突。外交官推动克制，但一场秘密代理战争正在进行，可能在很小的挑衅下演变为公开冲突。
The 2020–22 civil war in Tigray may have killed hundreds of thousands; a November 2022 US- and ally-brokered peace deal has effectively collapsed three years later. On November 7th the TPLF accused Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government of breaching the accord with drone strikes after clashes in Afar; Abiy halted federal funding to Tigray. Officials warn of mobilization: army leaders say TPLF must be eliminated, Tigrayan generals claim readiness, and Mekelle residents queue at banks to withdraw cash and stockpile provisions.
Three factors raise the risk above 2020. First, internal TPLF division: in March one faction ousted an interim president and installed a general, prompting disaffected soldiers to form an anti‑TPLF militia in Afar with covert federal support, producing frequent skirmishes. Second, Ethiopia–Eritrea ties have soured: Eritrea sent tens of thousands of troops in 2020; leaders now view each other as chief adversaries. Abiy — leading a landlocked country of about 130m people — openly seeks Eritrean ports; officials visited Bure, 70 km from Assab, and satellite images show a nearby drone base expansion. Third, the Sudan civil war connects actors: thousands of Tigrayans have fought with Sudan’s army, and Eritrea trains SAF units.
Allied realignments complicate the picture: Amhara Fano militias, which fought with Ethiopia in 2020, revolted in 2023 and routed government forces in eastern Amhara in a late‑September offensive, reportedly with help from Eritrea and the TPLF. Commanders from Tigray, Amhara, Eritrea and Oromia have met in Sudan. External backers (UAE, Egypt) have competing interests. Diplomats push restraint, but a covert proxy war is underway and could erupt into open conflict with little provocation.