欧洲将特朗普围绕格陵兰的施压解读为“绥靖”的反面教材，但文章认为这误读了1930年代的真正经验。当前的“框架”协议细节含糊，丹麦与格陵兰未参与谈判，而特朗普曾威胁动用武力或关税，已暴露跨大西洋联盟的结构性损伤。历史学者指出，将1930年代英法政策简单贴上“绥靖”标签并不准确，更贴切的是“遏制与威慑”的并行：在不稳定加剧的环境中，既通过谈判与条约限制对手，也同步建设硬实力。
关键教训在于威慑的量化投入。英法在1930年代并非消极退让，而是自至少1934年起推进再武装，并在1936年后加速。英国军费从1936年的1.85亿英镑升至1939年的7.19亿英镑，约四年内近四倍增长。1938年《慕尼黑协定》被视为为再武装争取时间；当时希特勒被威慑而未立即跨越全面战争门槛。尽管一年后遏制失败并爆发战争，但期间的军备与舆论转向，使英法及其帝国在开战时具备更强动员与承受能力。
对照当下，欧洲处境更弱：对俄乌战争久拖不决；对华关键供应（如稀土与半导体）暴露脆弱；为保安全承诺曾接受不对等贸易条件。尽管欧盟领导人警示“无规则世界”的到来，但行动滞后：除德国外，再武装进度缓慢，且尚无方案替代美国提供的约40%欧洲防务能力（含卫星与后勤）。文章结论是，遏制不足以应对强权竞争，欧洲必须以更快、更实质的威慑建设来对冲军事与经济胁迫。
Europe has framed Donald Trump’s pressure over Greenland as a lesson against “appeasement,” but the article argues this misreads the 1930s. The current “framework” is vague, Denmark and Greenland weren’t at the table, and threats of force or tariffs have already damaged the transatlantic alliance. Historians contend that Britain and France’s 1930s approach is better understood as parallel “containment and deterrence,” not simple capitulation—seeking negotiated limits while building hard power amid rising instability.
The decisive lesson lies in quantified deterrence. Britain and France pursued rearmament from at least 1934, accelerating after 1936. British defense spending rose from £185 million in 1936 to £719 million in 1939—nearly a fourfold increase over roughly four years. The 1938 Munich Agreement bought time to rearm and deterred an immediate escalation; although containment failed within a year, the interim buildup and public opinion shift improved mobilization and resilience when war came.
By contrast, Europe today is weaker: the war in Ukraine drags on; disputes with China exposed vulnerabilities in rare earths and semiconductors; and Europe accepted lopsided trade terms to preserve security guarantees. Despite leaders warning of a “world without rules,” action lags—outside Germany, rearmament is slow, and there’s no plan to replace roughly 40% of European defense capabilities currently provided by the US, including satellites and logistics. The conclusion is that containment alone is insufficient; Europe must accelerate concrete deterrence to withstand military and economic coercion.