文章将特朗普在2026年初对委内瑞拉的突袭描述为一种数量上可追溯、结果上高度重复的美国传统干预模式。过去一个世纪中，至少有十余位美国总统支持或实施过拉美政权更迭行动，其共同特征是短期军事成功与长期政治失败。此次行动中，美军在数小时内拘捕尼古拉斯·马杜罗，特朗普随即将理由从“民主与禁毒”转向对委内瑞拉石油的直接控制，并公开威胁至少六个其他国家。这种迅速升级、缺乏国会参与的行为在法律和制度层面都呈现出高度异常。
第二个关键在于规划缺失的量化后果。历史数据显示，美国在拉美干预后往往造成更大规模的人道与政治灾难：例如1970年代后，萨尔瓦多内战导致该国超过四分之一人口最终成为在美难民。近期在反毒行动中，美军对疑似走私船只的打击已造成100多人死亡。前国家安全顾问博尔顿指出，特朗普在委内瑞拉行动前既未建立国会支持，也未形成可持续的反对派联盟，反映其决策周期通常只覆盖“下一个新闻周期”，而非数月或数年的治理成本。
第三个维度是经济与能源数据揭示的时代错位。该行动为争夺石油而战，但全球能源结构正在快速变化：近年可再生能源年均增长接近30%，并在2025年上半年首次在全球发电量上超过煤炭。中国在2025年新增约360吉瓦风电和光伏装机，规模已超过美国现有总量。与1867年美国以720万美元购买阿拉斯加类似，这种资源导向的扩张在当下显得高度过时，却仍可能引发深远的地缘政治连锁反应。
The article frames Trump’s early-2026 raid on Venezuela as a numerically traceable repetition of US interventionism. Over the past century, at least a dozen US presidents have supported or executed regime-change operations in Latin America, typically marked by short-term military success and long-term political failure. In this case, Nicolás Maduro was seized within hours, after which Trump shifted his justification from “democracy and counternarcotics” to explicit control of Venezuela’s oil, while threatening at least six other countries. The speed of escalation and absence of congressional involvement make the operation legally and institutionally anomalous.
The second key is the measurable cost of planning failure. Historical data show that US interventions often generate larger downstream crises: after the 1980s civil war in El Salvador, more than a quarter of the country’s population eventually lived as refugees in the United States. More recently, US strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats killed over 100 people. Former national security adviser John Bolton argues that Trump neither built congressional backing nor established a viable opposition coalition in Venezuela, reflecting a decision horizon focused on the next news cycle rather than months or years of governance costs.
The third dimension is economic and energy misalignment. The operation centers on oil, even as global energy data show rapid transition: renewables have grown at nearly 30 percent annually in recent years and, in the first half of 2025, surpassed coal in global electricity generation for the first time. China alone added roughly 360 gigawatts of solar and wind capacity in 2025, exceeding total US capacity. Like the $7.2 million US purchase of Alaska in 1867, this resource-driven expansion now appears anachronistic, yet still capable of triggering lasting geopolitical consequences.