在 Dmitri Mendeleev 的元素周期表帮助界定现代化学 150 多年后，元素材料已成为一场新的商业与地缘政治角力的核心。随著对近 100 种天然存在元素中数十种的需求上升，各国政府与企业正竞相确保战略产业所需矿物的供应。这种压力与战争、能源转型和大国竞争相关，让矿物供应链从技术问题转变为核心政策优先事项。
美国对稀土的关注包括新的储备推动 Project Vault，而控制大部分稀土供应与加工的中国，已在与 Washington 及其盟友的争端期间实施出口限制。然而，稀土只约占 US Geological Survey 所认定 60 种关键矿物的 25%，显示脆弱性不只存在于单一类别。作为回应，美国在同一个月与包括日本和欧洲国家在内的伙伴启动新的协作推进，而更广泛的竞逐也可见于企业与国家行动，例如 Anglo American–Teck Resources 的整合，以及 Pentagon 为军事与通信用途入股 Louisiana 一家镓生产商。
文章将元素分为 3 个战略类别：工业必需品、加工集中度会形成杠杆的矿物，以及目前常见但未来需求可能更趋尖锐的金属，尤其是铜。压力最高的点在于同时用于电池与储能、国防与半导体的材料，因为跨部门需求会放大短缺与价格风险。其核心含义是，地缘经济权力如今取决于从采矿到精炼再到制造的端到端控制，而集中风险、出口管制与需求增长即使在绝对地质供应并不稀缺时，也可能加剧供应不安全。
More than 150 years after Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic table helped define modern chemistry, elemental materials have become central to a new commercial and geopolitical struggle. Governments and companies are competing to secure supplies of minerals needed for strategic industries, as demand rises across dozens of the nearly 100 naturally occurring elements. This pressure is linked to war, energy transition, and great-power rivalry, turning mineral supply chains from a technical issue into a core policy priority.
The US focus on rare earths includes a new stockpiling push, Project Vault, while China, which controls most rare earth supply and processing, has imposed export restrictions during disputes with Washington and allies. However, rare earths are only about 25% of the 60 critical minerals identified by the US Geological Survey, showing a broader vulnerability beyond one category. In response, the US launched a new collaboration drive in the same month with partners including Japan and European countries, and the wider race is visible in corporate and state actions such as the Anglo American–Teck Resources tie-up and a Pentagon stake in a Louisiana gallium producer for military and communications uses.
The article frames 3 strategic classes of elements: industrial essentials, minerals where processing concentration creates leverage, and currently common metals with potentially sharper future demand, especially copper. The highest stress points are materials used simultaneously in batteries and energy storage, defense, and semiconductors, because cross-sector demand can amplify shortages and price risk. The core implication is that geoeconomic power now depends on end-to-end control from mines to refining to manufacturing, with concentration risk, export controls, and demand growth likely to intensify supply insecurity even when absolute geological availability is not scarce.