中国房地产下行已持续四年，起点为 Evergrande 的首次违约。库存创纪录且仍在上升，新开工因销售与现金流疲弱而受限。Lian Ping 估计至 2030 年房地产投资收缩每年将削减 GDP 增速 0.25%，而建筑、家具、家电的连锁效应可能进一步扩大拖累。此压力与北京维持 4.17% 年均增速、在 2035 年达到“中等发达国家”目标形成直接矛盾。
高房价的扭曲在关键比率上表现最明显。Ren Zeping 的 2021 年研究显示，一线城市购房者需 22.2 年收入偿付一套住房，核心地段高达 67 年；对比 New York 约 11 年、London 14 年、Tokyo 11 年。Yang Weimin 的 2023 年分析指出住房支出已超过教育、医疗与食品总和，成为家庭最大负担。这种挤出效应解释了为何北京拒绝重新推升房价，因为过去的债驱动增长与投机已经造成结构性失衡。
住房价格下跌触发“反向财富效应”，削弱家庭在汽车、旅游、教育等领域的消费意愿。地方财政因土地收入下降而受压，而消费税改革与全国物业税等替代收入来源仍未落地。股票市场波动大、保护弱、政策干预频繁，无法替代房地产过去提供的财富功能。房地产去杠杆的必要调整与其对消费与信心的抑制形成矛盾，这将深刻影响未来十年的经济轨迹。
China’s property downturn has persisted for four years since Evergrande’s initial default. Inventories of unsold homes are at record highs and still rising, while weak sales and fragile cash flow suppress new construction. Lian Ping estimates that shrinking real estate investment will reduce annual GDP growth by 0.25% through 2030, with larger drag once construction, furnishings, and appliances are included. This pressure directly conflicts with Beijing’s target of sustaining 4.17% annual growth to reach “medium-level developed country” status by 2035.
Price distortions appear most clearly in key ratios. Ren Zeping’s 2021 study found that buyers in first-tier cities need 22.2 years of income to pay for a home and up to 67 years in prime districts, compared with roughly 11 years in New York, 14 in London, and 11 in Tokyo. A 2023 analysis by Yang Weimin concluded that housing costs now exceed combined spending on education, healthcare, and food. This crowding-out effect underpins Beijing’s refusal to reflate prices after years of debt-driven excess.
Falling prices generate a reverse wealth effect that curbs household spending on cars, travel, and education. Local-government revenue has eroded as land sales collapsed, while alternative revenue sources such as consumption-tax reform and a nationwide property tax remain delayed. Equity markets, constrained by volatility, weak protection, and policy intervention, cannot replicate real estate’s former wealth role. The structural correction and its suppression of consumption form a deep paradox that will shape China’s economic trajectory over the next decade.