2025年，Jua Power在肯尼亚塔图城（SEZ）建厂，成为其近六十年历史上首次直接海外投资，反映中国制造业增长放缓、国内太阳能利润下降后企业转向外部市场的趋势。2025年，中国在非洲制造业的外国直接投资跃升至123亿美元，分布在64个项目上，而2023年为246亿美元、35个项目，且2023年至2025年期间中国投资总额已超过美国与欧洲合计；肯尼亚已与逾1000家中国企业接洽，其中去年前宣布的7个旗舰项目里有6个已开工。与此同时，埃塞俄比亚制造业占GDP比重由2017年的6%降到2024年的4.4%，撒哈拉以南非洲2024年仅为10%，低于1981年的18%，国际货币基金组织预计2026年该地区将占全球20个最快增长经济体中的12个。

中国制造业“处于关键转折点”下的低利润与水泥、钢铁、电动车、太阳能等行业的价格战，推动企业向非洲布局，部分当地商品（如绷带）价格可达中国的3到4倍。多数中国工厂更偏向服务非洲本地或区域市场，而非“走向全球”的出口导向，埃塞俄比亚与撒哈拉以南非洲制造业占比下滑，以及“非洲成世界工厂”预期未成现实的背景下，这一模式引发了对挤压本地制造的担忧；其中，中国—非洲贸易逆差去年扩大65%至1020亿美元。中国自5月1日起取消对几乎所有非洲进口商品的关税，预计更有利于咖啡等农产品，对制造品出口帮助有限，而相关研究也指出，尽管有关企业取代本地制造的案例有限，但若贸易壁垒与地缘波动持续上升，本地起步工厂仍可能演进为更具出口竞争力的企业。

在支付领域，非洲跨境支付需求同步上升，麦肯锡预计到2028年非洲金融科技年收入将达470亿美元，其中一部分来自汇款和跨境交易替代服务。2015年至2025年，平均跨境支付成本已从交易额的8%降至低于6%，Wave覆盖法语区西非、Flutterwave服务超半个非洲市场，此外还出现多国持牌布局、稳定币支付、与银行或电信合作（如MTN与Onafriq）及面向侨民的购房、汇款、旅行消费场景。汇款占非洲GDP已达3.5%，且仍在上升，但网络普及率低、许可与新税费等监管限制，以及区域清算系统推进迟缓，使非洲跨境金融的“顺畅化”仍是中长期过程。

Jua Power’s 2025 move to build a solar factory in Tatu City, Kenya, was its first direct foreign investment in nearly 60 years, signaling a broader shift as slower domestic growth and weak solar profits in China make Africa comparatively attractive. Chinese FDI in African manufacturing rose to $12.3 billion across 64 projects in 2025, versus $24.6 billion across 35 projects in 2023, and in 2023–2025 China invested more than the U.S. and Europe combined, while Kenya is already in talks with over 1,000 Chinese firms and has already started six of seven flagship projects announced last year; Ethiopia’s manufacturing share fell from 6% of GDP in 2017 to 4.4% in 2024, and sub-Saharan Africa is at 10% in 2024, down from 18% in 1981, even as IMF forecasts put 12 of the world’s 20 fastest-growing economies in 2026 in Africa.

The chief push is now margin pressure: Chinese industry is facing low profitability and severe price wars in cement, steel, EVs, and solar, while African local prices can be three to four times higher than in China for items such as plasters. Most Chinese factories therefore target local or regional consumers rather than global export-led scaling, raising concerns about domestic displacement in African industry, especially after China-Africa trade deficit rose 65% to $102 billion last year; China’s planned tariff cuts from May 1 on almost all African imports are expected to support agriculture more than manufactured exports. Despite fears, evidence of large-scale displacement remains limited, and analysts argue that several investors are filling domestic manufacturing gaps, with the potential to evolve into larger exporters if tariff wars and geopolitical volatility reshape sourcing patterns.

Demand for cross-border payments is rising as African banking systems remain slow and costly, and McKinsey projects fintech revenue at $47 billion annually by 2028. Average international transfer cost fell from 8% of transaction value in 2015 to just under 6% by 2025, and major actors such as Wave (Francophone West Africa) and Flutterwave (more than half the continent) are expanding through multi-country licensing, stablecoins, and partnerships with banks and telecoms like MTN and Onafriq, especially for diaspora users. Remittances already account for 3.5% of Africa’s GDP and are increasing, but low internet penetration, licensing and tax barriers, and the slow rollout of a regional payments-settlement system mean seamless pan-African money movement will remain a long-term objective.

Source: Made in Africa, for Africa

Subtitle: TATU CITY A manufacturing buzz is attracting a new crop of Chinese investors

Dateline: The Economist May 2nd 2026