然而，不同观察者普遍认为，行业具有“去头化”特征：一个据点关闭后，农村与边缘区域会迅速出现更小规模的新据点。文章将其比作“九头蛇”，并指出这是一种低成本高回报的跨境商业模型：受害者多来自对“爱情、脱贫致富”叙事的误判。部分工人月薪可达1,500美元，明显高于柬埔寨与本国不少岗位水平；而国际估算也在支撑“高收益—高规模”叙事，美国和平研究所估计到2023年底，跨国网络涉非法网络赌博与诈骗每年窃取资金约640亿美元；2025年《Global Anti-Scam Alliance》报告估算，全球各类骗局12个月损失约4,420亿美元。文章还指出，加密货币体系（多钱包、跨链中继、混币器与交易所）的使用，进一步提高侦查难度，也使再分流（re-trafficking）风险上升，许多工人在一处机构被驱逐后即被转运至其他中心。
美国方面在2025年11月后对柬埔寨实施90天施压（与降低关税安排相连），并于2025年底成立“Scam Centre Strike Force”；泰国在2026年2月8日选举中以“打击诈骗”为议程助成政治胜利。柬方高层（如Hun Sen、Hun Manet、信息部长Neth Pheaktra）强调清剿决心，但执法协作在区域层面仍不足， Interpol与部分官员称“各自有领域化倾向”。因此，尽管不少场所“清场”，仍见到部分中国老板和受害者工人被临时安置（如金边旧机场货运区），并有迹象显示许多所谓“收网”行动更多是转移和重组。企业层面也被提醒，需通过尽职调查、合同保护和外部合规审查，避免与可疑地产或供应链开发商共生合作；在柬埔寨，出租人、运营商与地方生态（餐饮、快递、住宿）共同构成了“诈骗复合体”生存网络。
After only four months in Cambodia, Chen Xian Jin says he can quickly identify scam managers, and the article suggests that while crackdowns have disrupted some operations, they have not eliminated the industry. In Phnom Penh, formerly targeted buildings were emptied or destroyed, and displaced workers and staff still gather outside embassies, riverside areas, and cheap late-night venues. Cambodia faces heavy pressure from China, the US, and countries like South Korea, while Thai-Cambodian tensions and border raids have intensified political urgency. Official data cited in the report said that from early January to early February, raids hit 190 locations nationwide, including 44 casinos; over 2,500 people were detained and many computers and phones were seized. In Myanmar, authorities reported arrests of 330 Chinese nationals one month, and nearly 400 foreign nationals—including nearly 300 Chinese—the previous week.
Experts in the article describe a “hydra” dynamic: shutting major compounds often leads to two smaller ones appearing, often in rural or peripheral areas. Scamming remains a relatively low-cost, high-yield model, with some workers saying they could earn up to $1,500 per month, a strong pull in Cambodia and their home countries. Estimated losses remain massive: a US Institute of Peace report puts transnational criminal networks’ annual stolen funds from illegal online gambling and scam operations at around $64 billion by end-2023, while the 2025 Global Anti-Scam Alliance report estimates $442 billion lost globally to scams over 12 months. The shift to cryptocurrency and rapidly changing operational methods—multiple wallets, bridges, mixers, and exchanges—also lowers enforcement effectiveness and increases the chance workers are rapidly moved from one compound to another.
Policy pressure is now deeply tied to international diplomacy and trade leverage. The US gave Cambodia a 90-day deadline, part of a tariff-linked process, and also set up a Scam Centre Strike Force in late 2025 with the FBI and other agencies. In Thailand, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul used an election-time anti-scam platform on Feb. 8, while Bangkok also cites scam compounds in cross-border security arguments. Cambodian leaders, including Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and Information Minister Neth Pheaktra, publicly frame crackdowns as necessary, but officials and Interpol observers say cross-border coordination remains uneven and partly symbolic. The article notes repeated displacement cycles, continued relocation of operations (including to smaller sites), and the role of property owners, vendors, and supply-chain partners; it concludes that companies need stronger due diligence, contractual protections, and external legal-risk advice to avoid indirect exposure to scam ecosystems.