核心证据是明显的总体与微观脱节：Trump 第二任期前 12 个月中，GDP 成长 2.2%，S&P 500 上涨 16%，CPI 通膨平均 2.7%，Federal Reserve 降息 3 次，但新增就业仅 359000，对于仍在扩张的经济而言是至少 50 年来最弱。员工少于 50 人的企业仅在 November 就减少 120000 个职位，为 May 2020 以来最大单月降幅；而 2025 年截至 November 至少有 717 家公司申请破产，为 2010 以来最高。CFO 情绪被描述为可比 early 2020，同时家庭对劳动市场的感受也恶化：21% 认为工作难找、仅 24% 认为工作充足，两者皆是 February 2021 以来最差读数。
文章将这些趋势界定为：表面成长之下存在政策驱动的脆弱性。2024 年新增 1236000 个职位，约为 2025 年总量的 3.4 倍；长期年度非农就业变动约为 Trump 最新 12 个月结果的 4.5 倍，即使纳入重大收缩，例如 2020 年约流失 9000000 个职位与 2008-2009 年流失 8000000 个职位。分配层面的压力也由种族差距体现：Black 失业率在 April 2023 达 4.8%，Black 与全国失业率差距曾收敛至 1.4 个百分点，但到 Trump 任内 November 又扩大至 3.7 个百分点，接近 3 倍，且为 2020 以来最宽。金融信心指标也强化警讯：2025 年美元下跌 8.1%（2017 以来最大跌幅），消费者信心在 12 个月下滑 20% 后降至 May 2014 以来最低，尽管这种诠释仍属观点专栏式综合，而非单一因果模型。
Matthew A. Winkler argues that the 2026 State of the Union masks broad stress in the small-business economy: firms with fewer than 500 employees, which account for nearly 50% of private-sector payrolls, face record bankruptcy pressure and weak growth despite rising aggregate GDP. The piece links this strain to Trump-era trade and immigration policy, noting that only about 50% of farms are expected to be profitable while immigrant workers make up nearly 75% of crop labor. After a Supreme Court ruling against earlier emergency-tariff claims, Donald Trump announced a global 15% baseline tariff (up from 10%) under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which permits such duties for 150 days without congressional approval.
The central evidence is a sharp macro-micro disconnect: during the first 12 months of Trump’s second term, GDP grew 2.2%, the S&P 500 rose 16%, CPI inflation averaged 2.7%, and the Federal Reserve cut rates 3 times, yet payroll gains were only 359000, the weakest in at least 50 years for an otherwise expanding economy. Businesses with fewer than 50 employees cut 120000 jobs in November alone, the largest monthly drop since May 2020, and at least 717 companies filed for bankruptcy in 2025 through November, the highest count since 2010. CFO sentiment is described as comparable to early 2020, while household labor-market perceptions also deteriorated, with 21% saying jobs are hard to get and only 24% saying jobs are plentiful, both the worst readings since February 2021.
The article frames these trends as evidence of policy-driven fragility beneath headline growth: 2024 added 1236000 jobs, about 3.4 times the 2025 total, and the long-run annual nonfarm payroll change is cited as roughly 4.5 times Trump’s latest 12-month result, even when including major contractions such as the roughly 9000000 jobs lost in 2020 and 8000000 in 2008-2009. Distributional stress is highlighted by racial gaps: the Black unemployment rate reached 4.8% in April 2023 and the Black-national unemployment gap narrowed to 1.4 percentage points, but by November under Trump the gap widened to 3.7 percentage points, nearly 3 times larger and the widest since 2020. Financial-confidence indicators reinforce the warning signal, with the dollar down 8.1% in 2025 (largest decline since 2017) and consumer confidence at its lowest since May 2014 after a 20% drop over 12 months, though the interpretation remains an opinion-column synthesis rather than a single causal model.