从这个片段出发，文章追溯预测市场如何从小众预测快速扩张为主流的金融与媒体基础设施。Kalshi 与 Polymarket 在 2025 年底的估值分别为 $11 billion 与 $8 billion；在 Super Bowl 前后，Kalshi 每周押注金额超过 $2 billion，Polymarket 也紧追在后。透过与 CNN、CNBC、Dow Jones 的合作，分发与正当性同步扩大；同时 Intercontinental Exchange 宣布最多对 Polymarket 投资 $2 billion，主要交易公司也补上流动性。历史上，文章把当代成长连到更早的博彩传统（包括 1591 年教皇禁令）、1884-1940 年美国选举市场的准确度（15 次总统结果中有 14 次判对），以及现代制度里程碑：Kalshi 于 2018 成立、Polymarket 于 2020 成立、Polymarket 在 2022 与 CFTC 以 $1.4 million 和解、Kalshi 在 2024年9月 赢得政治市场诉讼，以及 2025-2026 年较友善的美国政策环境。
核心含义是：这些平台把自己包装为真相引擎，但持续面临信任与治理风险，包括操纵、内线优势、诱因扭曲与争议性裁决。案例证据包括一个禁食噱头市场在资料流中断后即被裁决、可疑交易如某次事件中的 $60,000 获利，以及其他争议事件中的 $1.2 million 与 $400,000 利润；还有治理权集中问题：在 Polymarket 争议裁决中，持有至少 1% 的 UMA 巨鲸控制了 95% 的投票权。监管与商业脆弱性仍高，至少有 12 起与 Kalshi 相关诉讼，Polymarket 也遭遇州层级的临时禁令/处置；即使 2026年1月-2月 的 CFTC 领导层释出支持性规则制定讯号，联邦与州的管辖权冲突仍未解。经济面上，体育主导了活动量（Kalshi 成交量超过 4/5，Polymarket 在美国活动的 100% 也是体育）；社会面上，文章主张把微事件金融化虽能强化预测，却可能缩窄注意力，让公共现实更像可被游戏化、也更不可信。
The article opens with a January 28 Federal Reserve press conference where traders on Kalshi wagered on 44 specific words Jerome Powell might say, with more than $2.8 million traded before he began. Real-time odds behaved like a live market: terms such as “shutdown” (67%), “layoffs” (76%), and “tariff inflation” (13%) moved as Powell spoke, and a late burst of words flipped outcomes at the end, including “projection,” “pandemic,” and “trade war.” A dramatic final slip, where Powell said “renovation” before correcting to “revolution,” shows how mention markets can hinge on single utterances. The mechanism is simple but powerful: users buy “Yes/No” contracts priced from $0.01 to $0.99 (1% to 99% implied probability) that pay $1 if correct, turning speech fragments and public events into tradable probability signals.
From that vignette, the piece traces prediction markets’ rapid scale-up from niche forecasting to mainstream finance-media infrastructure. Kalshi and Polymarket were valued at $11 billion and $8 billion in late 2025, and around the Super Bowl period users were wagering over $2 billion per week on Kalshi, with Polymarket close behind. Distribution and legitimacy expanded via partnerships with CNN, CNBC, and Dow Jones, while Intercontinental Exchange announced up to a $2 billion investment in Polymarket and major trading firms added liquidity. Historically, the article links modern growth to older betting traditions (including a 1591 papal ban), 1884-1940 US election-market accuracy (14 of 15 presidential outcomes called correctly), and modern institutional milestones: Kalshi founded in 2018, Polymarket in 2020, Polymarket’s 2022 CFTC settlement for $1.4 million, Kalshi’s September 2024 court win on political markets, and a friendlier US policy climate in 2025-2026.
The core implication is that these platforms market themselves as truth engines but face persistent trust and governance risks: manipulation, insider advantage, incentive distortions, and disputed resolutions. Case evidence includes a fasting stunt market that resolved after a feed cutoff, suspicious trades such as a $60,000 gain in one incident, other profits like $1.2 million and $400,000 in controversial episodes, and governance concentration where UMA whales holding at least 1% each control 95% of voting power in Polymarket dispute outcomes. Regulatory and business fragility remains high, with at least 12 Kalshi-related lawsuits, temporary state bans/actions against Polymarket, and unresolved federal-versus-state jurisdiction battles even as CFTC leadership in January-February 2026 signaled supportive rulemaking. Economically, sports dominates activity (more than 4/5 of Kalshi volume and 100% of Polymarket’s US activity), while socially the article argues that financializing micro-events can sharpen forecasting but narrow attention, making public reality feel more gameable and less trustworthy.