本文所述情境发生于 2026-01-19 05:00（UTC+8；original: 2026-01-19 05:00 GMT+8）。作者描绘 Asia 夹在两个更少自我约束的超级强权之间：美国在 President Donald Trump 之下以强硬手段「捕捉」Venezuelan 的 Nicolás Maduro、讨论对 Iran 的军事打击；China 则在 South China Sea 骚扰 Philippines 船只、持续恫吓 Taiwan。长期「China 提供经济成长、US 提供安全」的交换公式正在失效，使中小与中等国力国家在规则为本的国际秩序被测试时承受更高风险。
Canada 的 Prime Minister Mark Carney 在面对 Trump 对贸易安排与关税的不确定性时，于近八年来首次访问 Beijing，与 Xi Jinping 同意修复关系并降低进口障碍，包含大幅下调对中国电动车关税；他以「new world order」指称美方对国际规范的扰动。Singapore 的 Lee Hsien Loong 警告美方单边行动对小国构成系统性威胁。Minneapolis 中 Immigration and Customs Enforcement 探员射杀 Renee Nicole Good，引发对美国使用国内强制力的疑虑与对 China 的不安对照；分析者 Eric Olander（China Global South Project）指出，区域政府既被震动也保持务实，倾向不把 Washington 与 Beijing 视为二选一，而把 China 视为经济机会。
Lowy Institute 的 Asia Power Index 2025 显示 US 仍为 Asia 最具实力者，但其相对 China 的领先幅度缩至自 2020 以来最小，核心驱动是对 Trump 亚洲政策与关税路径的「不确定性」；同时 China 扩张军力并以自身关税与出口管制回击经济施压。作者也强调对 Beijing 意图的「显著怀疑」：在争议海域的冲撞与水炮、以及对违逆其政治偏好的国家进行经济报复，促使多国对过度依赖采取避险。因应策略被界定为「分散化」与「中等国家彼此深化合作」；具体动向包括 Carney 随后赴 Qatar 与 Switzerland 分散贸易，日本与 South Korea 因共同焦虑而靠近，以及 Australia 与 Philippines 强化军事连结并预计于当年在该国五处基地推动基础设施；India 作为第三大力量再度担任 BRICS 主席（第四次）以扮演 Global South 桥梁并推进贸易整合。
The situation described is dated 2026-01-19 05:00 (UTC+8; original: 2026-01-19 05:00 GMT+8). The author frames Asia as trapped between two increasingly unrestrained superpowers: the US under President Donald Trump, after a forceful “capture” of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and talk of strikes on Iran; and China, through harassment of Philippine vessels in the South China Sea and sustained intimidation of Taiwan. The long-running bargain—China for economic growth, the US for security—is eroding, raising exposure for smaller and middle powers as the rules-based order is stress-tested.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney, facing uncertainty over Trump’s trade posture and tariffs, made the first visit by a Canadian leader in eight years to Beijing and agreed with Xi Jinping to rebuild ties and lower import barriers, including sharply reduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles; he invoked a “new world order” to describe upended norms. Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong warned that unilateral US action is a systemic danger to small states. The Minneapolis killing of Renee Nicole Good by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent sharpened unease about American coercive force and prompted comparisons with China; analyst Eric Olander (China Global South Project) argues governments are shocked yet pragmatic, avoiding a binary Washington–Beijing choice and treating China as an economic opportunity.
The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2025 still ranks the US as Asia’s most powerful country, but its lead over China shrank to the smallest margin since 2020, driven mainly by uncertainty about Trump’s Asia approach and tariffs; meanwhile China expands military capabilities and counters economic coercion with its own tariffs and export controls. The author stresses persistent skepticism of Beijing: coercive behavior at sea (ramming and water cannons) and economic retaliation against political defiance reinforce hedging against over-reliance. The prescribed response is diversification and deeper middle-power cooperation; cited moves include Carney’s follow-on trips to Qatar and Switzerland, Japan–South Korea alignment amid shared anxieties, Australia–Philippines defense ties with infrastructure at five bases, and India—ranked third—chairing BRICS again for a fourth time to bridge the Global South and deepen trade integration.