自特朗普近一年前重返白宫以来，其对台政策释放出矛盾信号。尽管美国在12月批准了规模达$11.1 billion的对台军售（史上最大），中国仍持续加大军事压力，最近完成了对台湾的环岛军演。过去两个月的言行显示，特朗普在关键时刻未能清晰传达威慑立场，其对中国以武力改变台海现状的回应更多诉诸“希望”而非明确后果，削弱了长期以来通过言辞与行动划定红线的做法。

特朗普对习近平的个人外交进一步放大了不确定性。他计划于4月访问北京，并在去年的APEC期间未就台湾问题与中方展开实质讨论；会后习近平强调“台湾回归中国”是战后国际秩序的一部分，特朗普未予反驳。在“Justice Mission-2025”军演期间，特朗普将其淡化为已持续20年的常态化演训，称“没有什么让我担心”，等同于给予北京未来行动的回旋空间。同时，外界担忧特朗普可能以降低对台承诺换取中美经济让步，其言辞频繁强调中美关系而较少提及美台关系。

最新发布的国家安全战略加剧了担忧。文件将台湾的重要性主要置于经济与地缘通道层面：台湾在半导体中的主导地位、以及南海每年承载全球约one-third航运量的航道价值，成为“优先威慑冲突”的理由。这种以经济为先的框架引发疑问：若半导体或航运价值下降，防卫承诺是否动摇？在“势力范围”与西半球优先的取向下，北京可合理判断，美国对台反应将受其他优先事项掣肘，从而削弱可信威慑。

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House nearly a year ago, his Taiwan policy has sent mixed signals. While the US approved a record $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan in December, China has continued to intensify military pressure, recently completing encirclement drills around the island. Over the past two months, Trump’s words and actions have failed to convey clear deterrence, relying on hope rather than explicit consequences if Beijing were to change the status quo by force, weakening long-standing practices of defining red lines through rhetoric and action.

Trump’s personal diplomacy with Xi Jinping amplifies the uncertainty. He plans to visit Beijing in April and reportedly did not substantively discuss Taiwan at last year’s APEC meeting; afterward, Xi stressed Taiwan’s “return to China” as part of the postwar international order, without pushback from Trump. During the “Justice Mission-2025” drills, Trump downplayed the threat as routine exercises conducted for 20 years, saying “nothing worries me,” effectively granting Beijing leeway. Concerns persist that Trump could trade reduced Taiwan commitments for economic concessions, as he emphasizes US-China ties far more than US-Taiwan relations.

The newly released National Security Strategy deepens concern by framing Taiwan’s importance largely in economic and transit terms: its dominance in semiconductors and the South China Sea routes that carry roughly one-third of global shipping annually. This economics-first logic raises doubts about whether defense would persist if those values diminished. With an emphasis on spheres of influence and Western Hemisphere priorities, Beijing can reasonably infer that any US response would be weighed against competing interests, undermining credible deterrence when it matters most.