政治因素仍居核心。Benjamin Netanyahu 几十年将 Iran 当作存亡威胁叙事，持续战争可帮他延后选举。2023 年 10 月 7 日后，外界原以为会出现授权重建程序，但「战时不可改选」论述仍在。Efron 也认为外流的分析认为伊朗会在 6 个月至 1 年内崩溃，这一预测过度乐观且具战略风险，尤其在政权更迭希望落空时。她补充，实际作战中以色列对伊朗的阶段已与美国指挥高度绑定：最初 12 天高烈度冲刺后，Donald Trump 的指令成为主轴，因此美国总统一旦下令停止，行动可迅速收束。
她警讯另一个外溢前线。若没有更广泛的 Iran-Hezbollah 安排，Litani River 缓冲区设想可能变成事实上的占领，并让黎巴嫩由次要战线升为主战场。加萨方面，仅五个月的停火并未真正降温，巴勒斯坦死亡人数仍约 70,000，暴力持续。她认为 Hamas 不能只靠武力解除武装；两年 kinetic 政策失败，而加萨仍是分裂状态，Hamas 事实上控制约半数，另一半由以色列控制。她也将西岸事实上并吞与定居者暴力升高—尤其与 Bezalel Smotrich 的施政方向相关—视为整体右倾；到 2028 年，局势稳定取决于选举是否产生愿意降级冲突并重建区域可信度的新政府。
Shira Efron says Israeli public sentiment mixes support and fatigue. Israel has launched near-daily strikes on Iran for about four weeks (around 28 days), while Tehran’s retaliation has killed or wounded Israelis and disrupted daily life. Polling still shows about 80% backing, yet she says exhaustion is rising: families keep repeating shelter drills, and some reservists serve roughly 800 days; Israel has been at war for about 900 days since 2023. She says there is a recurring gap between claims that Tehran and Hezbollah threats were eliminated and renewed campaigns, and that two years of Gaza fighting have cost Israel around US$57 billion economically.
Politics remains central. Benjamin Netanyahu has treated Iran as an existential-security narrative for decades, and sustained conflict can help him postpone elections. After Oct. 7, many expected a renewed mandate process, but the “cannot hold elections in wartime” narrative remains. Efron also says leaked expectations that Iran would collapse within 6 months to one year were overly optimistic and strategically risky, especially when regime-change projections fail. She adds that the Israel-Iran campaign phase became tightly coupled with U.S. command: after a 12-day peak of strikes, Donald Trump’s orders became decisive, so a U.S. stop order could quickly end the operation.
She warns of further front-line spillover. Without a broader Iran-Hezbollah settlement, the Litani River buffer idea could become de facto occupation and push Lebanon from a secondary into a primary battlefield. In Gaza, a five-month ceasefire has not truly cooled hostilities, with Palestinian deaths still around 70,000 amid continued violence. She argues Hamas cannot be disarmed by force alone; two years of kinetic policy failed while Gaza remains split, with Hamas controlling about half and Israel the rest. She also links de facto annexation and rising settler violence in the West Bank, tied to Bezalel Smotrich’s direction, to an overall rightward shift; by 2028, stability depends on whether elections produce leaders willing to de-escalate and restore regional legitimacy.