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中国于 2025 年部署第三艘航母“福建舰”,其电磁弹射技术使其在性能上接近甚至匹敌美国 Ford 级,标志着中国海军能力与全球行动范围的跃升。中国造船产能为美国的 230 倍,并正建设第四艘大型航母,同时持续量产两栖登陆舰、军民两用货船与可用于台海行动的登陆驳船。中国舰队今年已在澳大利亚周边实施远洋绕行与塔斯曼海实弹演习,并在东海与南海多次以解放军海军、海警与海上民兵的混合力量构成高强度威慑与拦截,甚至发生追逐菲律宾船只时的碰撞事件。

中国在商业海运领域同样占据压倒性优势,控制全球超过半数造船产能、约五分之一的商船吨位,并运营遍布各洲的港口。其深海采矿布局广泛,渔船队则占全球捕捞活动约 30%,涉足 90 国海域,并多次被发现进入智利等国专属经济区边界。例如阿根廷曾公布巨型中国鱿鱼船队规模大到可由太空观察。这种远离本国海域的大规模资源获取,与东海及南海的既有胁迫模式叠加,使中国不断增强的海军实力对全球海洋规范构成系统性冲击。

中国的全球海上存在意味着对航行自由、海洋资源主权与贸易航线安全的直接威胁,并非局限于东亚,而可能在任何北京认为可借海军施压以获取资源或战略利益的海域出现。既有证据显示北京对国际法与航行自由行动并不买账,除非面临实质升级风险。要维护现行海洋秩序,各国必须集体采取强硬威慑,包括首次胁迫即施加严厉制裁并部署具备战力的多国海上巡逻,否则海洋规则将被中国单方面重写。

China’s 2025 deployment of its third carrier, the Fujian, featuring electromagnetic catapults comparable to the U.S. Ford class, marks a major escalation in Chinese naval capability and global reach. China’s shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the U.S., and a fourth supercarrier is already under construction. Its shipyards continue producing amphibious vessels, dual-use cargo ships, and landing barges suitable for Taiwan contingencies. This year, Chinese warships circumnavigated Australia and conducted short-notice live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea, while coordinated PLA Navy, Coast Guard, and maritime militia operations have intensified coercion in the East and South China Seas, including collisions during pursuits of Philippine vessels.

China simultaneously dominates commercial maritime sectors, accounting for over half of global shipbuilding, around one-fifth of global fleet tonnage, and operating ports worldwide. It is a leading force in deep-sea mining, while its distant-water fishing fleet accounts for roughly 30% of global activity, operating in 90 countries’ waters and repeatedly approaching or entering EEZ boundaries such as Chile’s and Argentina’s. The combination of expanding resource extraction, long-range maritime operations, and established aggressive behavior around its periphery makes China’s evolving naval power a structural threat to global maritime norms.

These developments imply direct risk to freedom of navigation, sovereign rights over maritime resources, and the security of trade routes, not only in Asia but wherever Beijing sees advantage in naval coercion. China’s conduct in the South China Sea shows it disregards international law absent credible escalation risks. Protecting maritime norms therefore requires collective and decisive deterrence—imposing real costs at the first instance of coercion, including severe sanctions and multinational naval patrols—lest China reshape the maritime order unopposed.

2025-11-28 (Friday) · 61f112f1a077ec941c38380aaf223b7b2afd5194