文章指出中国正以全面自给自足战略重塑全球贸易结构，形成对外“只卖不买”的体系。欧洲访谈显示，中国未来几乎没有意愿长期进口任何除大宗商品外的产品，并将半导体、软件、商用飞机与高端设备视为“住院医生式学生”阶段——即进口只是临时过渡，目标是完全国产化并最终出口。超过 150 家中国企业在技术密集领域迅速复制产品、叠加国家补贴、产业贷款与人民币维稳，使中国形成能在多数行业“做得更好更便宜”的自信。结果是贸易关系失衡：Goldman Sachs 估算，中国出口驱动型增长到 2035 年将对德国 GDP 增速造成约 0.3 个百分点拖累。

全球经济依赖互惠贸易，但若中国无意进口高价值产品，其贸易伙伴将难以维持产业就业与支付能力，最终只能依赖本国需求。作者指出中国在内部文件中依旧将“制造业与科技”排在消费之前，显示结构性转向的可能性极低；中国也持续担忧其巨额美元资产风险，反映其对不平衡结构的双重依赖与矛盾。外部国家几十年要求中国提升内需、减少补贴与让人民币升值均未奏效，政策惯性持续强化出口导向。

对欧洲而言剩下两条路：困难路径是提升竞争力，仿照美国凭科技创造新价值，需要更少福利与更少监管以承担竞争压力；坏的路径则是保护主义，以大规模贸易壁垒维持工业存续。后者将引发中国强烈报复并进一步破坏全球贸易体系，但在缺乏可贸易产品可卖给中国的前提下，保护主义逐渐成为不可避免的选择。

The article argues that China’s pursuit of comprehensive self-sufficiency is reshaping global trade into a system where it “sells but does not buy.” Interviews in China indicate that Beijing sees virtually no long-term need to import anything beyond commodities, treating current reliance on semiconductors, software, aircraft, and advanced machinery as a temporary, “resident-doctor” training phase before full domestic replacement and eventual export. More than 150 firms rapidly replicating technologies, combined with state subsidies, industrial loans, and currency support, have strengthened China’s belief that it can make most goods “better and cheaper.” This creates structural imbalance: Goldman Sachs estimates that China’s export-led growth through 2035 will drag German GDP by roughly 0.3 percentage points.

Global trade requires reciprocity, but if China refuses to import high-value goods, its partners cannot sustain industries, employment, or the ability to pay for Chinese exports, forcing them toward domestic-demand-only models. China’s policy priorities confirm this trajectory: the next five-year plan places “manufacturing and technology” above consumption, and decades of external pressure for more domestic demand, reduced subsidies, and a stronger renminbi have yielded little change. China itself worries about risks tied to its mountain of dollar assets, underscoring the unsustainable yet persistent imbalance.

Europe faces two options: the difficult route—becoming more competitive, similar to the US technology model, requiring structural reform, reduced welfare burdens, and lighter regulation; or the bad route—protectionism, erecting large-scale trade barriers to preserve remaining industries. The latter risks aggressive Chinese retaliation and further disintegration of the global trading system, yet with no attractive export offerings for China, protectionism becomes increasingly unavoidable.