Jim Rogers 警告较 2008 年更严重的金融危机可能于 2026 年全球爆发，理由指向疫情后政府债务失控与 AI 泡沫；Ray Dalio 亦将 2026 年类比 1936 年，认为货币体系、国内政治与国际秩序三重秩序同步松动，并提到「财富幻觉、社会撕裂、国际失序、科技垄断、天灾连锁」等五股力量交织。

美国私募信贷规模约 1.8 兆美元（US$1.8T），全球约 2.3 兆美元（US$2.3T）。3 月 6 日，BlackRock 旗下 HLEND（约 260 亿美元，US$26B）遭遇 9.3% 超额赎回但仅能按条款核准 5%；Blackstone 旗下 BCRED（约 820 亿美元，US$82B）赎回申请 7.9% 高于 7% 上限并需股东注资。资产结构上，资讯科技借款人占 30%（其中软体 20%）、医疗 11%、零售 13%（约 2,800 亿美元，US$280B），集中度与流动性紧缩共同放大「赎回潮」观感。

文中判断私募信贷更偏「局部挤兑风险」而非系统性危机：其一，违约与回收数据未显示全面恶化——Kansas City Fed 指银行对私募信贷贷款违约率 0.2% 低于工商贷款 1%，回收率 85% 高于 82%；其二，风险传递有限——养老金与保险持有私募信贷占资产仅 3.5%，商业银行占比 <1%，压力测试下 22 家大型银行一级资本充足率仍约 13%，且 96% 为第一顺位担保；其三，流动性与救助能力较强——市场内约 870 亿美元（US$87B）可动用流动性、场外逾 5,000 亿美元（US$500B）资金，基金杠杆 <2×，且必要时可由 Fed 以特别工具充当最后贷款人。

Jim Rogers warned that a financial crisis more severe than 2008 could sweep the world in 2026, citing runaway post‑pandemic government debt and an AI bubble; Ray Dalio similarly argued that 2026 resembles 1936, with monetary, domestic political, and global-order systems weakening simultaneously and five “destructive forces” interacting (wealth illusion, social fracture, international disorder, tech monopoly, and cascading natural shocks).

The text highlights stress in U.S. private credit: about US$1.8T domestically versus US$2.3T globally. On March 6, BlackRock’s HLEND (US$26B) faced redemption requests of 9.3% but could approve only 5% under fund terms; Blackstone’s BCRED (US$82B) saw 7.9% requests exceeding a 7% limit and required shareholder capital support. Borrower exposure is concentrated—information technology is 30% (software 20%), healthcare 11%, and retail 13% (about US$280B)—making liquidity tightening and shifting AI narratives amplify redemption pressure.

It concludes the risk is more likely a localized run than a systemic crisis: (1) broad asset deterioration is not evident—Kansas City Fed data show 0.2% default rates on banks’ private-credit loans versus 1% for commercial-and-industrial loans, with 85% recoveries versus 82%; (2) contagion channels are limited—pension/insurer holdings are only 3.5% of assets and banks’ holdings are <1%, while stress tests keep 22 large banks’ CET1 near 13% and 96% of bank private-credit loans are first-lien; (3) liquidity/backstops are sizable—about US$87B flexible liquidity on hand plus >US$500B available off-balance-sheet capital, fund leverage below 2×, and potential Fed facilities as lender of last resort if panic intensifies.