在美国、与以色列联动打击及伊朗之间历时近六周的战争后，巴基斯坦出人意料地成为两边都愿意在伊斯兰堡进行谈判的唯一渠道。接受采访的 Maleeha Lodhi 将此归因于持续的个人外交：巴基斯坦陆军总司令 Asim Munir 与总理 Shehbaz Sharif 几乎每日都与华盛顿和德黑兰保持联系，并且巴基斯坦透过先前对美的特殊手势建立关系，包括在重大反恐问题上的合作与在印巴冲突中促进安全降温。德黑兰也在早期外交通往升温后转向伊斯兰堡，包括阿里·Larijani等伊朗高级官员访问（其后遇刺身亡）；其他地区选项，包括阿曼，被认为在建立信任方面不够可行。

紧迫性具有极高实质性。巴基斯坦从海湾地区进口几乎90%的石油，并且在仍处于 IMF 计划中的脆弱经济体下进行谈判。为应对长期中断，伊斯兰堡提高了燃油价格并推出一系列紧缩措施。美伊双方都以强硬立场开局：伊朗要求在霍尔木兹海峡收取通行费，而美国则表态有意管理或规范该海峡，且黎巴嫩仍是争议范围问题。尽管如此，双方早在由阿曼斡旋的早期草案中已经接近妥协，显示每一方虽可各自宣称胜利，但在高昂成本后仍需要一项可挽面子的协议。

Lodhi 认为，此事件标志著体系性转向而非单次停火。美国与以色列的军事压力未能产生预期的政权崩解，重复的介入历史显示外部武力往往引发伊朗民族主义，而非内部分裂。由于双方都面临进一步经济痛苦，战争重演在政治上代价高昂，尤其若冲突每七个月循环一次。于这一走向多极化的情况下，巴基斯坦被塑造成新兴中等力量，而中国似乎在降温斡旋中获得更大影响力。海湾国家重新评估美国安全担保，印度面临战略性孤立风险，长期秩序更可能被重排，而非恢复原状。

After nearly six weeks of war between the US, Israel-linked strikes and Iran, Pakistan unexpectedly became the only channel that both sides were willing to use for talks in Islamabad. Interviewee Maleeha Lodhi links this to sustained personal diplomacy: Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif were in near-daily contact with both Washington and Tehran, and Pakistan had built unusual leverage through earlier gestures toward the US, including cooperation on high-profile counterterrorism issues and security de-escalation during the India-Pakistan clash. Tehran also warmed toward Islamabad after reciprocal diplomatic outreach, including visits by senior Iranian officials such as Ali Larijani before his death; other regional candidates, including Oman, were seen as less acceptable for confidence-building.

The urgency was highly material. Pakistan imports almost 90% of its oil from the Gulf and entered talks while still in an IMF program with an economy she described as very fragile. To prepare for prolonged disruption, Islamabad raised fuel prices and introduced austerity measures. Both Washington and Tehran entered with maximalist demands: Tehran sought fees in the Strait of Hormuz while the US signaled interest in operating or regulating it, and Lebanon remained a disputed scope issue. Yet both had already inched toward compromise during earlier Oman-mediated drafting, showing that each side could claim victory while still needing a face-saving deal after weeks of high costs.

Lodhi argues the episode marks a systemic shift rather than a one-off ceasefire. U.S. and Israeli military pressure failed to deliver the expected regime collapse, and repeated intervention history suggests external force tends to trigger Iranian nationalism instead of internal fracture. As both sides face further economic pain, war recurrence is politically costly, especially if conflict cycles “every seven months.” In this multipolar drift, Pakistan is cast as an emerging middle power, while China appears to gain influence as a broker of de-escalation. Gulf states reassess U.S. security guarantees, India risks strategic isolation, and the long-term order is likely to be realigned rather than restored.