自从 1962 年古巴导弹危机以来，美国从未如此左右古巴的命运。通过在抓获 Nicolás Maduro 之后控制委内瑞拉石油分配，美国切断了古巴最后一个可靠能源来源；新的关税威胁又阻止了墨西哥等伙伴填补缺口。3 月 16 日，古巴在 5 个月内第 4 次全国停电，抗议在增加，而高温在加剧，表明压力正在转化为人道与政治风险。

政权如今已被迫谈判。Miguel Díaz-Canel 于 3 月 13 日承认与美国接触，一项类似委内瑞拉模式的协议似乎正在形成。自 2 月中旬以来，美国事实上已允许燃料经私营部门运往古巴；拟议中的安排将扩大这一渠道，并允许美国尤其在能源领域投资。作为交换，政治犯将获释，流亡者将被允许不仅以游客身份返回，而且以企业主身份返回。然而，Castro 家族及其核心统治网络似乎仍将保住权力，Díaz-Canel 甚至可能被撤换以满足 Trump。

核心计算是比较替代方案。这个共产主义政权在离美国仅 100 英里的地方存活了 67 年，表明它不可能被一次性清除。零和封锁若在没有成果下结束，可能会强化该政权；继续挤压则不太可能引发成功推翻，反而可能制造美国门口的人道危机，并把古巴进一步推向中国和俄罗斯。更可行的路径是保留制裁，但以许可证和可逆的石油流动强制履约：若释放囚犯停滞，燃料也应停滞；若私营部门增长快于国家部门，政权控制空间将随之收缩。

Not since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 has America held so much leverage over Cuba. By controlling Venezuelan oil distribution after capturing Nicolás Maduro, America cut off Cuba’s last reliable energy source; renewed tariff threats also deterred partners such as Mexico from filling the gap. On March 16th Cuba suffered its 4th nationwide blackout in 5 months, while protests rose and heat intensified, showing pressure is turning into humanitarian and political risk.

The regime has now been forced to negotiate. Miguel Díaz-Canel admitted contacts with America on March 13th, and a Venezuela-style deal appears to be emerging. Since mid-February America has in practice allowed fuel shipments to Cuba through the private sector; the proposed arrangement would expand that channel and permit American investment, especially in energy. In exchange, political prisoners would be freed and exiles allowed to return not only as tourists but as business owners. Yet the Castro family and its core ruling network would probably retain power, and Díaz-Canel might even be removed to satisfy Trump.

The central calculation is comparative. This communist regime has survived 67 years only 100 miles from America, showing it is unlikely to be removed in one stroke. Ending the blockade with no gains could strengthen the regime; continuing the squeeze is unlikely to trigger a successful overthrow, but could produce a humanitarian crisis on America’s doorstep and push Cuba further toward China and Russia. The more workable path is to keep sanctions but use licences and reversible oil flows to enforce compliance: if prisoner releases stall, fuel should stall too; if the private sector grows faster than the state sector, the regime’s room for control should shrink.