主要机制是总体经济层面：如果部分劳工利用 AI 带来的生产力提升来维持全职工作并增加支出，总需求就会上升并推高物价，包括那些偏好较短工时的人也会受到影响。AI 也会降低某些部门的成本，尤其是软体、平面设计服务，以及其他可自动化的工作，但建筑业、清洁、托育、住房和许多服务等较少自动化的领域，生产力提升可能有限，劳动成本反而上升。这些上升的劳动成本可以透过 Baumol 效应转嫁给消费者；文章指出，在美国，得益于自动化和外包，服装自 1970 年以来变得更便宜，而医疗保健这种劳动密集型服务则变得大幅更昂贵。
从历史上看，更高的生产力并没有带来多少额外休闲：1900 年到 2005 年间，美国生产力大幅上升，但年轻与年长劳工的平均休闲时间每天增加不到 1 小时，中年劳工则略为下降。文章还指出，住房、交通和医疗保健占家庭预算的比重很大，因此如果这些项目的价格持续上涨，一些劳工可能不得不工作更多，只为维持生活水平。结论是，若没有不同的制度或规范，例如强制性的每周工时限制或高度累进税，AI 更可能提高消费和价格，而不是缩短工作周，最后由选民与政策制定者来决定科技究竟是在增加财物还是增加自由时间。
AI boosters such as Sam Altman, Jamie Dimon and Bill Gates have suggested that artificial intelligence could cut the work week to 4 days, 3.5 days, or even 2 days, but the article argues that this is far from likely under current economic structures. The central point is that productivity gains from AI do not automatically become more leisure, because workers face a trade-off between more consumption and more free time, and the economy-wide effects of many workers making that choice at once can keep working hours high.
The main mechanism is macroeconomic: if some workers use AI-driven productivity gains to keep working full time and spend more, aggregate demand rises and pushes up prices, including for those who prefer shorter hours. AI will also lower costs in some sectors, especially software, graphic design services, and other automatable tasks, but less-automated areas such as building trades, sanitation, childcare, housing, and many services may see limited productivity gains and higher labor costs. Those rising labor costs can be passed through to consumers through Baumol effects; the article notes that in the US, apparel has become cheaper since 1970 thanks to automation and outsourcing, while healthcare, a labor-intensive service, has become considerably more expensive.
Historically, higher productivity has not delivered much extra leisure: from 1900 to 2005, US productivity rose dramatically, but average leisure time increased by less than 1 hour per day for younger and older workers and fell slightly for middle-aged workers. The article also notes that housing, transportation, and healthcare take a large share of household budgets, so if prices there keep rising, some workers may have to work more just to maintain living standards. The conclusion is that without different institutions or norms, such as enforced weekly work limits or highly progressive taxes, AI is more likely to raise consumption and prices than to shrink the work week, leaving voters and policymakers to decide whether technology augments possessions or free time.