欧洲正失去时间：在阿布扎比举行的美国、俄罗斯与乌克兰会谈几乎没有欧洲参与，而在唐纳德·特朗普第二任期的第一年里，欧洲政府原本试图争取时间来扩建自身防务，但最新的格陵兰危机使这种盘算骤然改变。随着美国对跨大西洋安全架构的撤退与敌意，局势变化快于欧洲政府的适应速度；若想在未来十年获得持久稳定，欧洲必须直面其对美国在现代作战关键体系上的高度依赖。
欧洲拥有人力、装甲与飞机，也日益具备政治意愿，但缺少把这些资产整合成可信战力的“战略使能器”，而这些（卫星、情报网络、电子战与远程打击）仍压倒性地由美国提供。以太空为例，美国大约运作250颗专用军事卫星，欧洲约有50颗且多为狭窄的国家任务，这意味着美国规模约为欧洲的五倍；没有自主的太空与ISR/EW能力，欧洲在危机中就难以独立行动，正如乌克兰在很大程度上依赖（主要是美国的）西方卫星支援来追踪俄军、协调部队并防空。
因此，北约欧洲成员国防务开支的激增若只是加固以美国为骨干的既有计划，欧洲仍将是安全消费者；资金应主要用于建立欧洲自己的战略使能“骨干”，并把向乌克兰提供欧洲卫星数据与通信、以及在乌克兰快速测试与规模化电子战工具，作为欧洲必须最终依赖体系的试验场。与此同时，远程打击的关键不只是昂贵且产量很小的美国系统，而是像乌克兰以低成本无人机与导弹所展示的那样，发展足够便宜、准确且简单、可在冲突所需的“数百万单位”规模上量产的打击体系，从而加速学习与工业化并降低对美国巡航导弹与轰炸机的依赖。
Europe is running out of time: the Abu Dhabi talks among America, Russia, and Ukraine have proceeded with minimal European input, and in the first year of Donald Trump’s second term European governments tried to buy time to build their defenses, but the latest Greenland crisis sharply changed the calculus. As America retreats from and turns hostile to the transatlantic security architecture, the ground is shifting faster than Europe can adapt; for lasting stability in the decade ahead, Europe must confront its heavy dependence on U.S. systems that make modern warfare work.
Europe has manpower, armor, and aircraft and growing political will, but it lacks the “strategic enablers” that bind these assets into a credible force, and those enablers—satellites, intelligence networks, electronic warfare, and long-range strike—remain overwhelmingly American. In space, the U.S. operates roughly 250 dedicated military satellites while Europe has around 50, many for narrow national missions, so America’s constellation is about five times larger; without sovereign space and ISR/EW capabilities, Europe cannot act independently in a crisis, as Ukraine’s reliance on mostly American Western satellite support to track Russian forces, coordinate units, and defend airspace underscores.
That is why the surge in European NATO defense spending cannot simply reinforce plans built on an American backbone: it should largely build a European backbone of strategic enablers, using Ukraine—via European satellite data and communications and rapid EW testing and scaling—as the proving ground for systems Europe itself must ultimately rely on. For long-range strike, the endurance contest Ukraine illustrates favors accurate, cheap, simple systems producible at “millions of units” scale rather than costly American systems made in small numbers, and linking Europe’s carmakers and advanced manufacturers with defense startups and missile designers could accelerate learning and industrialization while reducing reliance on U.S. cruise missiles and bombers.
Source: To protect itself, Europe needs the systems that make warfare work
Subtitle: That means spending big, but wisely, on satellites, intelligence networks and the like, write Nico Lange and Fabrice Pothier
Dateline: 1月 29, 2026 04:18 上午