伊朗核计划在2026年2月28日美国和以色列发动战争后成为核心安全问题。战争若要被视为成功，必须将伊朗获得核武器的进程推迟多年。伊朗已将铀浓缩至武器级，并储存约400公斤高浓铀，理论上足以制造约10枚核弹。该材料被埋藏在国内设施中，一旦落入敌对政权或潜在军阀之手，将构成严重扩散风险。新最高领袖莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊被认为比其前任更倾向发展核武器，这使冲突后的核扩散风险进一步上升。
美国面临的第一个选择是派遣特种部队夺取核材料。这一行动需要持续数天的占领行动，由专门突击部队实施，并需超过1,000名士兵提供保护和持续空中支援。虽然在技术上可行，但风险极高，且情报显示400公斤高浓铀分散在两到三个地点，可能使部分材料难以获取。即便成功夺取，伊朗仍保留核技术与知识，可在未来重新启动浓缩计划。
第二个选择是持续军事打击，只要伊朗重新推进核计划就实施轰炸。然而这意味着反复战争和高昂成本，因为伊朗已证明其低技术无人机和导弹能够扰乱全球能源市场并冲击海湾经济。第三个选择是通过协议结束核威胁，例如停止铀浓缩、接受国际监测，并稀释或移除高浓铀。尽管存在违约风险，这一方案仍被认为最现实，因为伊朗在战争和制裁压力下需要经济重建与制裁解除。2015年核协议曾提供类似但临时的安排，但2018年被美国退出。
Iran’s nuclear programme became a central security issue after the war launched by the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026. For the conflict to count as a success, it must delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons for years. Iran has enriched uranium to weapons-grade levels and holds roughly 400kg of highly enriched uranium, theoretically enough for about ten nuclear bombs. This material is buried within domestic facilities and poses a severe proliferation risk if controlled by a hostile regime or, in a collapse scenario, by warlords seeking buyers. The new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is widely believed to be more willing than his predecessor to pursue a bomb, increasing post-war nuclear risks.
The first option for America is to deploy special forces to seize the nuclear material. Such an operation would require a multi-day occupation involving a specialist assault force protected by more than 1,000 troops and continuous air support. Although technically feasible, the mission would be highly risky, and intelligence indicates the 400kg of uranium may be split across two or three locations, potentially leaving some beyond reach. Even if the material were captured, Iran would still retain the technical knowledge required to restart enrichment in the future.
A second option is repeated military strikes whenever Iran rebuilds its nuclear capacity. However, this implies recurring wars and high costs, as Iran has already demonstrated that low-tech drones and missiles can disrupt global energy markets and destabilize Gulf economies. The third option is a negotiated agreement ending the nuclear threat through measures such as halting enrichment, accepting international monitoring, and diluting or removing highly enriched uranium. Despite the risk of cheating, this path is considered the most realistic because Iran needs sanctions relief to rebuild its economy after war damage. The 2015 nuclear agreement provided a similar but temporary framework before the United States withdrew in 2018.