自2026年2月28日美国与以色列攻击伊朗以来,海湾合作委员会(GCC)六国遭受大量报复性袭击。十天内伊朗向海湾地区发射超过2,000枚导弹和无人机,其中超过一半针对阿联酋。3月9日对巴林唯一炼油厂的无人机袭击造成32人受伤并迫使国家石油公司宣布不可抗力。尽管各国都受到影响,但威胁分布不均,且各国在应对战争问题上仍缺乏统一立场。
分歧部分源于对美国战略的不信任。战争前六个海湾国家都曾劝阻美国发动攻击,并担心美国可能迅速撤出冲突。民调显示美国公众多数反对战争,总统支持率约38%。与此同时,伊朗仍持续攻击,使部分海湾官员认为克制政策已经失败。鹰派人士主张在美国仍参与的情况下采取军事行动以建立威慑,否则伊朗可能在战后通过持续无人机袭击或骚扰海湾航运来施压。
国内政治与地区关系也限制了联合行动。以色列媒体曾报道阿联酋和卡塔尔参与对伊朗攻击,但两国迅速否认并对相关泄密表示愤怒。海湾国家内部也存在不同利益,例如阿布扎比倾向更强硬外交政策,而迪拜更依赖贸易并倾向保持中立。此外,一些国家面临国内宗派紧张,例如巴林什叶派人口占多数,若政府加入战争可能引发新的社会动荡。因此目前海湾国家普遍采取谨慎立场,但战争持续时间越长,内部争论可能越激烈。
Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, 2026, the six members of the Gulf Co-operation Council have faced extensive retaliation. Within ten days Iran launched more than 2,000 missiles and drones toward Gulf states, with over half directed at the United Arab Emirates. A drone strike on March 9 hit Bahrain’s only oil refinery, injuring 32 people and forcing the state oil company to declare force majeure. Although all Gulf countries have been affected, the damage has been uneven and the bloc remains divided over how to respond.
Part of the disagreement stems from distrust of American strategy. Before the war all six Gulf governments urged Washington not to attack Iran and fear that the United States could abandon the conflict quickly. Public opinion polls in America show a majority opposed to the war, with the president’s approval rating around 38%. Meanwhile Iran continues striking Gulf targets, leading some officials to argue that restraint has failed. Hawks believe the states should retaliate while America is still engaged in order to create deterrence, warning that Iran could otherwise maintain pressure after the war through drone attacks or harassment of shipping.
Domestic politics and regional relationships also constrain a unified response. Israeli media reports claiming that the United Arab Emirates and Qatar had already attacked Iran were swiftly denied, angering Gulf leaders who suspect deliberate leaks. Internal differences persist as well: Abu Dhabi favours a more assertive policy toward Iran while Dubai prefers neutrality because of its commercial ties. Some states also face internal sectarian tensions, particularly Bahrain where a Shia majority has long complained about Sunni rule. Joining the war could therefore trigger unrest, leaving Gulf governments cautious despite growing security pressures.