选战与市场段落以数字呈现张力：民调显示执政联盟可能在 2 月 8 日选举扩大原本「偏薄」的多数；她主张加速讨论调降食品消费税，导致公债殖利率冲到「过去难以想像」的水准，引发外界拿英国前首相 Liz Truss 的无财源减税风暴作类比。近期市场虽在过去数周相对平静（部分因美国可能支撑汇率的预期），但风险结构未变：股市接近历史高点、日圆持续疲弱、殖利率上行，而政府债务约为 GDP 的 230%，且年度支出的约四分之一已用于债务利息与偿付；她若以成长优先，可能与 Bank of Japan 在升息速度上冲突，并可在今年借由任期到期的人事更替影响政策；她在 2024 年曾称过早升息「stupid」。支持度也呈世代差：在 30 岁以下族群中，一度接近 90%。
地缘与产业政策以比率与时点串起：Sanae Takaichi 自 10 月上任后，提前推动国防支出上调，并把台湾安全与日本连结以致中国不满；在她 11 月提及若 Xi Jinping 政府入侵台湾日本可能动用军力后，中国称将限制对日出口可军用物资，并以稀土等供应链作为隐含杠杆。她把「经济安全」制度化：筹设国家情报机构、推动反间谍法、建立外资审查委员会，并以国家主导投资 AI、基础建设与半导体来强化工业基础；同时强化与美国总统 Donald Trump 的连结，且把国防支出在本财政年度推进至 GDP 的 2%。个人叙事则用数字佐证其非世袭形象与工作方式：曾每日通勤 6 小时；1993 年首度进入国会、1996 年加入 LDP；思想受 Margaret Thatcher 与 Shinzo Abe 影响。她主张终结「apology diplomacy」，曾常赴靖国神社但上任后克制，并与南韩总统 Lee Jae Myung 互动升温；盟友形容其「lone wolf」作风同时是优势与弱点。
The article traces how Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi formed her governing worldview. In the mid-1980s she entered an elite program mentored by Konosuke Matsushita, where the first 2 years followed a regimented routine: waking at 6 a.m. to clean, full days of lectures on economics, politics, and philosophy, completing a 100-kilometer (62-mile) walk, and mastering kendo. As Matsushita forecast a 1990s Japanese slump and a global shift toward Asia, Takaichi, around age 24, began aiming for politics and absorbed the idea of “managing the state” like a company, with the leader acting as chief executive officer.
Numbers frame the election-market tradeoff. Polls indicate her ruling coalition may expand a slim majority in the Feb. 8 vote; a pledge to accelerate talks on cutting the sales tax on food sent bond yields to previously “unthinkable” levels and drew comparisons to Liz Truss’s unfunded tax-cut shock. Markets have been calmer in recent weeks, partly on perceptions the US would help support the currency, yet the constraints remain: stocks near record highs, persistent yen weakness, and rising yields alongside debt around 230% of GDP, with roughly a quarter of annual outlays already devoted to debt servicing. A growth-first stance could clash with the Bank of Japan on the pace of rate hikes, and expiring terms this year would let her reshape the policy board; she said in 2024 it would be “stupid” to raise rates before the economy fully exits deflation. Her support shows a generational spike, at times nearing 90% among under-30s.
Geopolitics and industrial policy are tied to ratios and timing. Since taking office in October, Takaichi has pulled forward defense increases and linked Taiwan’s security to Japan, angering China; after she said in parliament in November Japan could deploy its military if Xi Jinping’s administration invades Taiwan, China said it would restrict exports to Japan of goods with potential military use, implicitly threatening rare-earth supply lines. She is institutionalizing “economic security” via a national intelligence agency, an anti-espionage law, and inbound-investment screening, while prioritizing state-led investment in AI, infrastructure, and semiconductors; she has also tightened ties with US President Donald Trump and accelerated plans to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP in the current fiscal year. Biographical details reinforce a non-dynastic, solitary style: a 6-hour daily commute in youth, entry to parliament in 1993, joining the LDP in 1996, and influences from Margaret Thatcher and Shinzo Abe; she has argued to end “apology diplomacy,” often visited Yasukuni in the past but has refrained since taking office, and has cultivated ties with South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung, while allies warn her “lone wolf” approach is both strength and vulnerability.