美国太空军于2025年7月正式接收GPS下一代作战控制系统（OCX），这距离最初规划的2016年完工已过近十年。该计划原本预算为37亿美元，但GPS III地面系统现已提高至76亿美元；RTX表示，为即将发射的GPS IIIF星座补强OCX还将超过4亿美元，合计接近80亿美元。虽然RTX称交付为可执行任务能力，但地面控制体系至今仍未达到全面作战可用状态。
在验收后，Thomas Ainsworth向国会表示，当使用真实GPS卫星、地面天线与使用者终端进行更贴近实战的测试时，几乎所有子系统都出现更多系统缺陷，且不少仍未解决。Ainsworth称OCX已历经15年技术困难、时程延误与成本上升，已威胁到未来卫星发射与能力部署。因OCX持续延迟，军方自2020年起改造既有老旧控制系统，以便先行使用部分GPS III与M-code能力；M-code旨在提高抗干扰能力、提高欺骗干扰（spoofing）门槛，并在冲突中保留美国与盟友优势。
政府问责局曾指出，2016年因超出成本与进度门槛而启动自动化五角大厦检讨，主因是采购决策不当与缺陷识别滞后。网路安全功能与软体品质问题持续被列为核心缺口，包括长期偏高的软体缺陷率。如今Ainsworth认为，只要OCX持续存在体系性问题，维持旧系统升级是一种可行路径；五角大楼同时讨论了中止OCX或回撤策略。由于乌克兰及中东冲突凸显GPS易受干扰风险，OCX未决的去向仍具有高度战略影响。
The US Space Force formally accepted delivery of the GPS Next-Generation Operational Control System (OCX) in July 2025, nearly a decade after the program was first scheduled for completion in 2016. The program started with a $3.7 billion budget expectation, but the official cost for the GPS III ground segment is now $7.6 billion. RTX says the planned augmentation for incoming GPS IIIF satellites will exceed $400 million, pushing total effort to about $8 billion. Although RTX described the delivered system as mission-capable, the ground control stack still has not reached full operational readiness.
After acceptance, Thomas Ainsworth told Congress that operationally realistic testing using real satellites, ground antennas, and user terminals exposed many more problems across nearly all subsystems, and many remain unresolved. He said OCX has suffered 15 years of technical failures, schedule slips, and cost growth that threaten future launches and satellite capability timelines. Because OCX lagged, the military retrofitted legacy control infrastructure beginning in 2020 so some GPS III functions and M-code use could start earlier. M-code is intended to reduce jamming and spoofing vulnerability while allowing U.S. and allied forces to retain an advantage in conflict.
The Government Accountability Office found that in 2016 the program triggered an automatic Pentagon review after cost and schedule targets were breached, attributing this to poor acquisition decisions and delayed recognition of development issues. Cybersecurity integration and software quality defects—especially a persistently high software defect rate—were repeatedly cited as root causes. Ainsworth now says continuing legacy upgrades is a viable option as OCX continues to show systemic issues. Pentagon deliberations include cancellation or reversal options. With active warfare pressure in Ukraine and the Middle East highlighting GPS vulnerability, OCX’s future remains strategically consequential.